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Abstract—The framework of cognitive wireless radio is ex-
pected to endow the wireless devices with the cognition-
intelligence ability, with which they can efficiently learn and
respond to the dynamic wireless environment. In many practical
scenarios, the complexity of network dynamics makes it difficult
to determine the network evolution model in advance. As a result,
the wireless decision-making entities may face a black-box net-
work control problem and the model-based network management
mechanisms will be no longer applicable. In contrast, model-free
learning has been considered as an efficient tool for designing
control mechanisms when the model of the system environment
or the interaction between the decision-making entities is not
available as a-priori knowledge. With model-free learning, the
decision-making entities adapt their behaviors based on the
reinforcement from their interaction with the environment and
are able to (implicitly) build the understanding of the system
through trial-and-error mechanisms. Such characteristics of
model-free learning is highly in accordance with the requirement
of cognition-based intelligence for devices in cognitive wireless
networks. Recently, model-free learning has been considered as
one key implementation approach to adaptive, self-organized
network control in cognitive wireless networks. In this paper, we
provide a comprehensive survey on the applications of the state-
of-the-art model-free learning mechanisms in cognitive wireless
networks. According to the system models that those applications
are based on, a systematic overview of the learning algorithms
in the domains of single-agent system, multi-agent systems and
multi-player games is provided. Furthermore, the applications
of model-free learning to various problems in cognitive wireless
networks are discussed with the focus on how the learning
mechanisms help to provide the solutions to these problems and
improve the network performance over the existing model-based,
non-adaptive methods. Finally, a broad spectrum of challenges
and open issues is discussed to offer a guideline for the future
research directions.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, heterogeneous networks,
decision-making, reinforcement learning, game theory, model-
free learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Cognitive Radio Networks
The original concept of Cognitive Radio (CR) was first
proposed a little over one decade ago [1]. In a broad sense,
CR is defined as a prototypical radio framework that adopts
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a radio-knowledge-representation language for the software-
defined radio devices to autonomously learn about the dy-
namics of radio environments and adapt to changes of appli-
cation/protocol requirements. In recent years, Cognitive Radio
Networks (CRNs) have been widely recognized from a high-
level perspective as an intelligent wireless communication
system. A device in a CRN is expected to be aware of
its surrounding environment and uses the methodology of
understanding-by-building to reconfigure the operational pa-
rameters in real-time, in order to achieve the optimal network
performance [2], [3]. In the framework of CRNs, the following
abilities are typically emphasized:
• radio-environment awareness by sensing (cognition) in a
time-varying radio environment;
• autonomous, adaptive reconfigurability by learning (intel-
ligence);
• cost-efficient and scalable network configuration.
Many recent studies on CR technologies focus on radio-
environment awareness in order to enhance spectrum effi-
ciency. This leads to the concept of Dynamic Spectrum Access
(DSA) networks [4], which are featured by a novel PHY-
MAC architecture (namely, primary users vs. secondary users)
for opportunistic spectrum access based on the detection of
spectrum holes [5]. It is worth noting that by emphasiz-
ing the network architecture of spectrum sharing between
the licensed/primary networks and the unlicensed/secondary
networks [4], “DSA networks” is frequently considered a
terminology that is interchangeable with “CR networks” [3].
The rationale behind such a consideration is that a secondary
network relies on spectrum cognition modules to make proper
decisions for seamless spectrum access without interfering
the primary transmissions. For this category of works in
the literature, “learning” is mostly about the techniques of
feature classification for primary signal identification [6]. For
an overview of the relevant techniques, the readers may refer
to recent survey works in [7]–[9].
However, in order to achieve autonomous and cost-efficient
network configuration, the functionalities of self-organized,
adaptive reconfigurability also become fundamental for CRNs,
since these functionalities shape the mechanisms of network
control and transmission strategy acquisition. By emphasiz-
ing such an objective, the network management mechanism
is required to dynamically characterize the situation of the
decision-making entities in the network and accordingly infer
the proper transmission strategies. As the network manage-
ment mechanisms in conventional wireless networks are ac-
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Fig. 1. Relationship between the functionalities of cognition and intelligence
in a cognitive wireless network.
quiring more and more levels of such a cognition-intelligence
ability, the border between a pure CRN (namely, a CRN
in the sense of DSA networks) and a conventional wire-
less network is gradually diminishing [10], [11]. In recent
years, the emerging networking technologies (e.g., CRNs
and self-organized networks [12], [13]) emphasize more on
autonomous, adaptive reconfigurability. For these networks,
the concept of “intelligent network management” based on
“cognition” can be re-defined as providing the functionalities
of autonomous transmission policy adaptation according to the
radio-environment awareness capability of the CR devices in
numerous dimensions across the networking protocol stacks
[11]. In Figure 1, we provide an overview of the perceivable
network states for cognition and the cross-layer network func-
tionalities for configuration in cognitive wireless networks.
Interested readers are referred to recent surveys such as [14],
[15] for more details about the CR applications in different
protocol layers.
Considering the distributed nature of wireless networks, a
good CR-based framework of autonomous network config-
uration in time-varying environments needs to address the
following questions:
1) How to properly configure the transmission parameters
with limited ability of network modeling or environment
observation?
2) How to coordinate the distributed transmitting entities
(e.g., end users and base stations) with limited resources
for information exchange?
3) How to guarantee the network convergence under the con-
dition of interest conflicts among transmitting entities?
The need to address question 1) lies in the fact that in
practical scenarios, the abilities of environment perception
may be limited on different levels and/or for different devices.
Therefore, the solution to the problems raised by question 1)
requires that a decision making mechanism should be able
to learn the transmission policies without explicitly knowing
the accurate mathematical model of the networks beforehand.
Meanwhile, questions 2) and 3) are raised by the basic require-
ment of a self-organized, distributed control system. Only by
addressing questions 2) and 3) can the network configuration
process be efficient in both information acquisition and policy
computation. In summary, the key to answering questions 1),
2) and 3) lies in the prospect of enabling the devices in CRNs
to distributively achieve their stable operation point under the
condition of information incompleteness/locality.
B. From Model-Based Network Management to Model-Free
Strategy Learning
When the designer of (distributed) network-controlling
mechanisms has complete and global information, the network
control problem are frequently addressed in the model-base
ways such as the optimization-decomposition-based formula-
tion/solution [16]. With a model-base design methodology, the
network control algorithms are usually designed as a set of
distributed computations by the network entities (also known
as decision-making agents in the domain of control theory)
to solve a global constrained optimization problem through
decomposition. Under such a framework, since the model of
the network dynamics is known in advance, there is no need
for “learning” anything about the network dynamics other than
the time-varying network parameters. However, in order to
adopt such a design methodology, it is necessary to assume
that the set of the network parameters (e.g., channel informa-
tion and channel availability probabilities) that determines the
target network utilities is fully available or perfectly known
to all the CR devices1. If an equilibrium [18] of a multi-
entity network is expected instead of the global optimality, the
game theoretic approaches (e.g., for multiple access problems
[19] and network security problems [20]) can also be adopted.
Similar to the optimization-decomposition-based solutions, the
game theoretic approaches may still depend on a pre-known
model of the network dynamics. In this case, the mathematical
tools of optimization theory can also be used for the game
theoretic approaches to achieve the goal of obtaining an
equilibrium or locally optimal payoff, given that the strategies
of the other network entities are accessible.
However, due to the practical limitation of information
incompleteness/locality, directly applying the model-based so-
lutions will face difficulties since a model of the network
dynamics may even not be available in advance, or in most
cases its details may be inaccurate or not instantaneously
known to every device. Under the model-based framework, the
attempts to conquer the obstacles of information incomplete-
ness/inaccuracy are limited within a small scope by allowing
more uncertainty/inaccuracy in the a-priori network model.
Examples of these attempts include the introduction of robust
control (e.g., variation inequality for spectrum sharing [21])
and fuzzy logic (e.g., fuzzy logic for call admission control
[22]). Nevertheless, these techniques still lack the strength of
fully addressing the three questions raised in Section I-A.
The difficulty of obtaining an accurate model in advance
for dynamic network control in practical scenarios can be
illustrated by a multimedia transmission task over an one-
hop OFDM-based ad-hoc network (Figure 2). In the network
1More details about the common assumptions for the model-based methods
can be found in [17].
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Fig. 2. Scalable video transmission over a one-hop OFDM-based ad-hoc
network.
illustrated by Figure 2, the goal of the transmitter-receiver pairs
is to achieve the minimized end-to-end distortion through joint
power allocation, channel code adaptation and source coding
control over dynamic channels. In the practical situation, the
obstacle for obtaining an appropriate device behavior model
first lies in the difficulty in constructing an accurate end-to-end
rate-distortion model at the source codec level, since modeling
the rate-distortion relationship for MPEG-4 Scalable Video
Coding (SVC) mechanism is notoriously difficult [23]. More-
over, one analytical model may only apply to a certain category
of video sources [23]. Meanwhile, the stochastic evolution of
the channel condition makes it difficult to predict the transition
of the states for the channel-coding/retransmission mechanism,
which in return will result in uncertain error propagation at
the video decoder of the receiver [24]. Furthermore, when
distributed power control and subcarrier allocation mechanism
is adopted, it is impractical for a transmitter-receiver pair to
fully observe the transmission behaviors of the other pair of
nodes, thus rendering the optimal power-channel allocation
difficult with merely the local channel observation. As a result,
without knowing the end-to-end distortion model, the channel
evolution model and the information of peer-node behaviors,
the wireless nodes are facing a black-box optimization prob-
lem with a limited level of coordination. In this situation,
it will be difficult to apply the aforementioned model-based
methods for the solution of video transmission control.
In the scenarios of black-box network optimization/control
with limited signaling, it is highly desirable that the network
control mechanisms do not depend on the a-priori design
of the devices’ behavior model. As a result, the methods
of controlling-by-learning without the need for the a-priori
network model, namely, the model-free decision-making ap-
proaches [25], [26], are considered more proper, especially
within the framework of CR technologies. In the context of
adaptive control, controlling-by-learning in CRNs is usually
described by the cognition-decision paradigm (Figure 3) [1].
This paradigm describes the learning-based strategy-taking
process of a single device from a high-level perspective and
Fig. 3. Cognition cycle of a single wireless device [1].
interprets it as a cognition cycle to present the information
flow from environment cognition to the final network control
decision. In the paradigm, the model-based decision making
process is replaced by the observation-decision-action-learning
loop. However, the paradigm itself does not provide any
detail on how much information about the system model
should be learned before a proper transmission strategy can be
determined, or in what way the information could be learned.
Under the settings of not knowing a network model in
advance, the strategy-learning process can be further divided
into two categories according to the ways of using the model
knowledge obtained from the learning process: the “model-
dependent” methods and the “model-free” methods [25]. For
model-dependent learning, an arbitrary division exists between
the learning phase and the decision phase, and the goal of
learning is to construct the network model first and then use
it to derive the network control strategies. By contrast, model-
free learning directly learns the network controller without
explicitly learning the network model in advance. Early re-
search has pointed out that the model-dependent learning
methods are generally more computationally intensive, while
model-free learning makes a trade-off of the time to reach
controller convergence for reducing computational complexity
[25]. Although most of the existing research on strategy-
learning methods in wireless networks focus on model-free
learning due to the limited computational resources in mobile
devices, recent years have seen a tendency that the border
between the two categories of strategy-learning methods keeps
diminishing [26].
C. A Brief Review of the Existing Survey Works on Learning
in CRNs
As indicated by our discussion in Sections I-A and I-B, the
problem domain of learning in cognitive wireless networks
can be divided into two categories: the problems of wireless
environment cognition (namely, spectrum sensing) [7]–[9]
and the problems of network management (namely, strategy
learning). The solutions to the former problem sub-domain
generally provide the information that works as the feed-in
to the strategy managers of the latter problem sub-domain. In
the literature, the existing surveys on the network management
problems are generally organized in accordance with the pro-
tocol layers of the OSI/ISO model. These problems include the
DSA-based MAC protocol design in CRNs [3], [4], [27], [28],
routing protocol design in CRNs [14], [29] and cross-layer
4TABLE I
SUMMARY OF EXISTING SURVEY WORKS ON CR NETWORKING PROBLEMS AND MODEL-FREE LEARNING METHODS
Problem Domain of
Cognitive Wireless
Networks
Sub-domain of CR Network-
ing Problems
Category of Corresponding
Machine-learning Methods
Sub-category of Learning Methods
Wireless environment
cognition
Spectrum sensing [7]–[9] Supervised learning (pattern
classification) [6], [32]
N/A
Network management
DSA-based MAC protocol
design [3], [4], [27], [28] Unsupervised learning(model-free learning)
[25], [26], [33]–[35]
Single-agent-based reinforcement
learning [25]
Spectrum-aware routing [14],
[29]
Multi-agent-based reinforcement
learning [26], [34]
Self-organization [12], [30] Learning automata [35]
Network security [20], [31] Repeated-game-based learning [33],
[36], [37]
network control problems in CRNs such as self-organization
[12], [30] and network security problems [20], [31].
With respect to different domains of networking problems,
the pool of the potential machine-learning-based solutions
can also be grouped into two major categories. For the
problems of spectrum sensing, the survey on applications of
signal-classification-oriented learning methods can be found in
recent studies such as [6], [32]. For the network management
problems, the (model-free) strategy-learning-based solutions
are generally identified as belonging to the category of un-
supervised learning [6]. More specifically, the techniques of
controlling-by-learning in CRNs are usually featured by the
trial-and-error interactions with the dynamic wireless environ-
ment and thus also known as “reinforcement learning” (see
our discussion in Section II). In the past decade, researchers
have paid a significant attention to the confluence of adaptive
control, model-free learning and game theory [26], [33]. In the
domain of CRNs, it is believed that such a trend will lead to a
promising solution of the various network control/resource al-
location problems (e.g., [28], [31]). In return, the development
of the recent network technologies, such as self-organized
networks and CRNs, is increasingly demanding more efficient
learning mechanisms to be implemented for an adaptive, self-
organized solution.
Most of the existing model-free learning methods for net-
work control in CRNs find their origin in the domain of control
theory. In the literature, important surveys on these model-
free learning methods from the perspective of control/game
theory include [25], [26], [33]–[35]. In the context of network
control, existing survey works on the applications of strategy
learning usually focus on a certain sub-category of these
learning methods. In [36], [37], comprehensive surveys on
distributed learning mechanisms are provided based on the
framework of repeated games (see our discussion in Section
II-C). In [6], [38], the surveys on model-free learning in
CRNs place the focus more directly on the Q-learning based
methods (see our discussion in Section II-A). Apart from the
aforementioned works, other survey works on strategy learning
in wireless networks usually focus on a specific sub-domain of
applications such as wireless ad-hoc networks [39] and sensor
networks [40]. To assist the readers in obtaining an overview
of the development of model-free learning methods and their
relationship with the network management problems in CRNs,
we summarize the aforementioned survey works according to
the domains they belong to in Table I.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF ACRONYMS FOR WIRELESS NETWORKING TERMINOLOGIES
Terminologies Abbreviations
Base station BS (Section III, V)
Cognitive radio CR (Section I, III, IV, V)
Cognitive radio networks CRNs (Section I, III, IV, V)
Dynamic channel assignment DCA (Section III)
Dynamic spectrum access DSA (Section I, III)
Key performance indicator KPI (Section VI)
Network operator NO (Section V)
Primary user PU (Section III, IV, V)
Signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio SINR (Section IV, V)
Signal-to-noise-ratio SNR (Section III, V)
Service provider SP (Section V)
Secondary user SU (Section III, IV, V)
Heterogeneous networks HETNET (Section IV)
D. Organization of the Paper
This paper is devoted to providing a comprehensive sur-
vey on the current development of model-free learning in
the context of the cognitive wireless networks. In order to
highlight the difference in the existing level of information
incompleteness/locality (from another perspective, the degree
of information coupling) for different learning mechanisms,
we organize the survey on the applications of learning in
CRNs into three major categories: (a) strategy learning based
on the single-agent systems, (b) strategy learning based on
the loosely coupled multi-agent systems and (c) strategy
learning in the context of games. In Section II, the necessary
background and the preliminary concepts of learning in the
single-agent system, the distributed, multi-agent systems and
games are provided. In Section III-V, the recent research
on the applications of the three major categories of model-
free learning mechanisms in CRNs is reviewed according to
the different system models that the learning mechanisms are
based on. In Section VI, some important open issues for the
application of model-free learning in CRNs are outlined in
order to provide the insight into the future research directions.
Finally, we summarize and conclude the paper in Section VII.
In Table II and Table III, we provide an acronym glossary of
the terms used in the paper.
II. BACKGROUND: MODEL-FREE LEARNING IN THE
DOMAINS OF DISTRIBUTED CONTROL AND GAME THEORY
Although the applications of model-free learning in wireless
networks only became more commonplace in the early 2000s,
the fundamental development of the model-free learning the-
ory can be traced back much earlier, to the 1980s [41], [42].
5TABLE IV
SEQUENTIAL DECISION-MAKING MODELS IN A NUTSHELL
General Model Specific
Model
Tuple-Based Model Description Agent-
Strategy
Coupling
Objective Utility
Measurement
Multi-agent
Markov
Decision
Process (MDP)
/ Stochastic
Game (SG)
Single-agent
MDP
〈S,A, r,Pr(s′|s, a)〉 N/A Utility optimization Accumulated
utility
Multi-agent
MDP
〈N ,S = ×Sn,A = ×An, {rn}n∈N ,Pr(s′|s,a)〉 Allowed Utility optimization Accumulated
utility
Stochastic
games
〈N ,S = ×Sn,A = ×An, {rn}n∈N ,Pr(s′|s,a)〉 Always Reaching equilibria Accumulated
utility
Repeated
games
〈N ,A = ×An, {rn}n∈N 〉 Always Reaching equilibria Accumulated
utility
Static games 〈N ,A = ×An, {rn}n∈N 〉 Always Reaching equilibria Instantaneous
utility
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF ACRONYMS FOR MODEL-FREE LEARNING TERMINOLOGIES
Terminologies Abbreviations
Actor-critic learning AC-learning (Section II,
VI)
Actor-critic learning automata ACLA (Section II)
Correlated equilibrium CE (Section II, V)
Correlated-Q learning CE-Q learning (Section V)
Constrained Markov decision process CMDP (Section III)
COmbined fully DIstributed PAyoff and
Strategy-Reinforcement Learning
CODIPAS-RL (Section II,
V)
Derivative-action gradient play DAGP (Section V)
Dynamic programming DP (Section II)
Distributed reward and value function DRV function IV
Distributed value function DVF (Section IV)
Experience-weighted attraction learning EWAL (Section VI)
Fictitious play FP (Section II, V)
Greedy policy searching in the limit of
infinite exploration
GLIE (Section II)
Gradient play GP (Section III)
Learning automata LA (Section II, V)
Linear-reard-inaction algorithm LR−I (Section II, V)
Multi-agent Markov decision process MAMDP (Section II, III)
Multi-agent system MAS (Section II, IV, V, VI)
Markov decision process MDP (Section II, III)
Nash equilibrium NE (Section II, V, VI)
Observation-orient-decision-action loop OODA loop (Section I)
Partially observable Markov decision
process
POMDP (Section III, IV)
Single-agent Markov decision process SAMDP (Section II, III)
State-action-reward-state-action SARSA (Section II, III)
Single-agent system SAS (Section II, III)
Stochastic games SGs (Section II, V)
Smoothed/Stochastic fictitious play SFP (Section V)
Simultaneous perturbation stochastic ap-
proximation
SPSA (Section V)
Temporal difference learning TD-learning (Section II, III,
VI)
Transfer learning TL (Section VI)
In this section, we provide a necessary introduction of the
general-purpose learning methods that are developed in the
domains of distributed control and game theory. To assist
our discussion about learning techniques applied to cognitive
wireless networks, we categorize the learning methods by the
degree of coupling among the decision-making agents with
respect to different system models. In what follows, we will
briefly introduce the general-purpose learning algorithms that
are built upon the decision-making models of single-agent
systems, loosely coupled multi-agent systems and game-based
multi-agent systems. Before proceeding to more details of the
learning mechanisms, we first provide an overview of these
decision-making models in Table IV. The notations used in
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN NOTATIONS IN SECTION II
Symbol Meaning
t Timing index
a A single action of the decision-making agent in a single-
agent system
a−n The joint action of the adversary agents for agent n in
a game
An A finite set of actions for agent n in a multi-agent
system
s A single environment state of the agent in a single-agent
system
Sn A finite set of environment states for agent n in a multi-
agent system
un(sn, an)
or un
Instantaneous utility function of agent n in a multi-
agent system
Pr(·) State transition probability function
β The discount factor for a discounted-reward MDP
π(s, a) or π The policy mapping function of an agent from a given
state to an action
π∗ An optimal or equilibrium policy
π(s, a−n)
or π−n
The joint policy of the adversary agents for agent n in
a game
V pi
β
(s) The state-value function of a discounted-reward MDP
from the starting state s
Qpi
β
(s, a) The state-action value function of a discounted-reward
MDP from taking action a at the starting state s
hpi(s) The state-value function of an average-reward MDP
from the starting state s
V pi(s) The bias utility of an average-reward MDP from taking
policy π at starting state s
αt, θt The learning rates
r˜ The (normalized) value of environment response used
by learning automata algorithms
this section are list in Table V.
A. Single-Agent Strategy Learning
In the context of distributed control and robotics, single-
agent learning has been considered as the most fundamental
class of the strategy-learning methods. Single-agent learning
generally assumes that the learning agent has full access to
the state information that can be obtained about the system.
Frequently, the terminologies “reinforcement learning” and
“model-free learning” are (partially) used interchangeably to
refer to the decision-making process of a single agent. The
agent learns to improve its performance by merely observing
the state changes in its operational environment and the
utility feedback that it received after taking an action. In
the recent surveys on reinforcement-learning theory and its
applications [6], [38], such a decision-learning process is
6Fig. 4. The OODA loop, often known as the cognition cycle [1].
described by an abstract model, namely, the Observe-Orient-
Decision-Action (OODA) loop [4]. The OODA loop (Figure
4) can be considered as a generalized model of the cognition
cycle in the context of cognitive wireless networks (Figure
3), and it provides a generic description of the information
flow in the intelligent decision-making process. However, it
is the task of the specific reinforcement-learning methods to
define the rules of agent behaviors that guide the interaction
with the to-be-explored environment. Since in most of the
practical scenarios, a learning agent needs to deal with en-
vironment uncertainty, in the literature, a Markov Decision
Process (MDP) [43] becomes a prevalent tool for abstracting
the model of the agent-environment interaction. Based on the
MDP framework, various model-free learning methods such as
Temporal Difference (TD) learning [44] and learning automata
[35] can be adopted to define the behavior rules of an agent.
The standard (single-agent) MDP model is used to describe
a stochastic Single-Agent System (SAS). Mathematically, a
single-agent MDP is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Single-agent MDP [26]). A single-agent MDP
is defined as a 4-tuple: 〈S,A, u,Pr(s′|s, a)〉, in which
• S = {s1, . . . , s|S|} is a finite set of environment states,
• A = {a1, . . . , a|A|} is a finite set of agent’s actions,
• u : S×A×S→R is the instantaneous utility function,
• Pr : S×A×S → [0, 1] is the state transition probability
function, which retains the Markovian property.
In the MDPs, the underlying environment is a stationary
stochastic process, and the consequences of the decisions can
be probabilistic. The goal of a decision-learning agent is to find
the proper stationary policy, π=Pr(a|s) that probabilistically
maps state s to action a so that the accumulated long-term
utility of the agent is optimized. With respect to different
applications, the objectives of the MDPs may appear in
different forms. In this survey, we will mainly consider two
types of the infinite-horizon objectives [25] as follows:
• the discounted-reward MDP with the discount factor β∈
[0, 1]:
V piβ (s) = Epi
(
∞∑
t=0
βtut(st, a)
)
, (1)
• the average-reward MDP:
hpi(s) = lim
T→∞
1
T
Epi
(
T−1∑
t=0
ut(st, a)
)
. (2)
Both types of MDPs can be represented in the form of the
Bellman optimality equation. For the discounted-reward MDP,
the Bellman equation can be represented either by the state-
value function starting from state s under policy π:
V piβ (s) = Epi(u(s, a)) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr(s′|s, π)V piβ (s′), (3)
or by the state-action value function (Q-function) that starts
from taking action a at state s and follows policy π thereafter:
Qpiβ(s, a) = u(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr(s′|s, a)V piβ (s′). (4)
In order to express the average-reward MDP in the form of
the Bellman equation, the average adjusted sum of utility (i.e.,
bias) following policy π is introduced as follows:
V pi(s) = lim
T→∞
Epi
(
T−1∑
t=0
(ut(st, a)− hpi(s))
)
, (5)
with which the average-reward MDP can be expressed by the
state-value function2:
V pi(s) + hpi(s) = Epi(u(s, a)) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr(s′|s, π)V pi(s′). (6)
With a variety of on-line learning methods that estimate the
optimal Q-value or the bias value, a broad spectrum of value-
iteration-based learning algorithms have been proposed [26],
[45]. Among them, the most widely used model-free learning
algorithm is Q-learning [44], which estimates the state-action
value in (4) of a discounted MDP based on the time difference
of the estimated values for the state-action value function:
Qt+1(st, at)←Qt(st, at)+αt
(
ut(st, at)
+βmax
a′
Qt(st+1, a
′)−Qt(st, at)
)
,
(7)
where αt ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate specifying the step that
the current state-action value is adjusted toward the TD sample
u(st, at)+βmaxa′ Qk(st+1, a
′). Q-learning in (7) has been
proved to be able to converge to the true optimal value of
the state-action value function with a stationary deterministic
policy, given that
∑∞
t=0 αt = ∞,
∑∞
t=0 α
2
t < ∞ and all
actions in all states are visited with a non-zero probability
[44]. The model-free property of Q-learning is reflected in
the iterative approximation procedure for the Q-values, which
does not require knowing the transition map Pr(s′|s, a) of the
MDP in advance.
The counterpart to Q-learning in the average-reward MDP
is known as R-learning [45]. In addition to learning the state-
action value of the bias expressed in (5), R-learning also needs
to learn the estimate of the average reward hpi. Therefore, R-
learning is performed by a two-time scale learning process:
Rt+1(st, at)←Rt(st, at)+αt
(
u(st, at)+max
a′
Rt(st+1, a
′)
−ht−R(st, at)
)
,
(8)
2Due to the space limit, the conditions for the existence of a value function
in the form of (6) is not presented here. The readers are referred to [45] for
the details.
7ht+1←ht + θt
(
u(st, at) + max
a′
Rt(st+1, a
′)− ht
−max
a′
Rt(st, a
′)
)
.
(9)
In contrast to the value-iteration-based learning algorithms
given in (7), (8) and (9), the decision-learning methods based
on the Learning Automata (LA) allow an agent to directly
learn the stationary randomized policy. Instead of updating the
action according to the myopic optimal Q-value in discounted-
reward MDP and bias-value in average-reward MDP, the LA
directly updates the probabilities of actions based on the
utility feedback [35]. Let the action probability vector at time
instance t be π(t) = (π1(t), . . . , π|A|(t)), where |A| is the
size of the action set. Then an LA-based algorithm should be
able to achieve the following goal [35]:
π∗ = max
pi(t)
E[r˜(t)|π(t), s(t)], (10)
where r˜ is the value of environment response, and is usually
generated based on the instantaneous reward ut as a normal-
ized value (i.e., r˜ ∈ {0, 1}). The general updating rule for LA
can be expressed as follows [46]:

πi(t+1)=πi(t)−(1−r˜(t))fi(πi(t))+r˜(t)gi(πi(t)),
∀a(t) 6= ai,
πi(t+1)=πi(t)+(1−r˜(t))
∑
j 6=i fi(πi(t))−
r˜(t)
∑
j 6=i gi(πi(t)), a(t) = ai,(11)
where f and g are the penalty and reward functions, respec-
tively. Specifically, different forms of f and g lead to different
learning schemes. Among them, it has been proved that the
linear-reward-inaction (i.e., LR−I ) algorithm is guaranteed to
achieve the ǫ-optimal policies [47]. In [45], the automaton-
updating procedure based on LR−I is adopted to learn the
optimal policy in the ergodic MDPs with average-reward
objectives3. In other works such as [48], the optimal policy of
the discounted-reward MDP is learned by adopting the LR−I
algorithm for policy updating and the standard Q-learning
algorithm in (7) for Q-value estimation at the same time.
Although the two groups of learning mechanisms, namely,
value-iteration-based learning (e.g., TD-based learning such
as Q-learning and R-learning) and LA-based learning appear
distinct from each other, both of them can be considered as
special cases in the framework of Actor-Critic (AC) learning
[49]. In the context of AC learning, the concepts of value
function and policy are also known as “critic” and “actor”,
respectively. Since Q-learning and R-learning only learn a
state-action value function and there is no explicit function
for the policy, the two learning algorithms are also known
as the critic-only algorithms. On the contrary, without using
any form of a stored value function, LA can be considered
an actor-only algorithm. Extending from these two special
cases, a generalized AC-based mechanism keeps track of both
the state-value function and the policy evolution at the same
time. In this sense, a generalized AC-based mechanism is
also known as combined payoff and strategy learning [37].
Specifically, if the state-action value of the MDP is learned
following the TD-based methods and in the meanwhile the
3For the details of LR−I , please refer to Section V-A3.
Fig. 5. Schematic view of the generalized AC algorithm.
learning agent’s policy is updated following the LA-based
methods, the AC-learning mechanism is also known as Actor-
Critic LA (ACLA) [50]. A typical rule for jointly updating
the estimate of the state-value and policy in ACLA can be
found in [50]. Here it is worth noting that for both critic and
actor updating, the learning mechanisms are not limited to the
aforementioned two categories of algorithms. For example, an
on-policy learning algorithm, i.e., State-Action-Reward-State-
Action (SARSA)4, can be used to replace the Q-learning-based
critic-updating mechanism, and instead of the LA-like actor-
updating mechanism, policy gradient is widely used for actor
updating [49]. A schematic overview of the generalized AC
algorithm is given in Figure 5.
B. Strategy Learning in the Loosely Coupled Multi-Agent
System
A stochastic Multi-Agent System (MAS) can be defined
by extending the 4-tuple Single-Agent MDP (SAMDP) (Def-
inition 1) into a 5-tuple Multi-Agent MDP (MAMDP):
〈N ,S,A, {un}n∈N ,Pr(s′|s, a)〉, in which N is the set of the
decision-making agents, S=×Sn is the Cartesian product of
the local state spaces of all the agents and A=×An is the
Cartesian product of the local action spaces of all the agents.
When considering the learning mechanism in an MAS, it is
natural to simply adopt the standard SAS-learning algorithms
by assuming that each agent is an independent learner with the
local utility function un(sn, an). In doing so, the activities of
the other agents are treated as part of a stationary environment
and the learning agents update their policy without considering
their interactions with the other agents. This approach enjoys
popularity especially within the studies in the cooperative
decision-making domain [52], [53]. Its typical applications
can be found in modeling the hunter-prey systems [54] and
team coordination [55], just to mention a few. However, it
is important to note that multi-agent learning based on SAS
learning requires the joint learning process to be decomposed
into local ones. Thus, individual-agent behaviors are relatively
disjoint, and the agents are able to ignore the information
raised by the interactions with each other. This is also the
reason for us to call it a “loosely coupled multi-agent system”.
Otherwise, with concurrent learning, all the individual agents
4About the difference between Q-learning and SARSA, the readers are
referred to [51] for more details.
8need to adapt their policies in the dynamic context of the
other learners, in which case the basic assumption of stationary
environment for the single-agent scenarios will no longer hold.
Although convergence of SAS-based learning is not guaran-
teed in most of the practical MAS scenarios, attempts of gener-
alizing the convergence condition for the SAS-based learning
mechanism can still be found in the literature. By limiting
the application scenarios to fully-cooperative MAMDPs (i.e.,
common-payoff MAMDPs), the convergence property of SAS-
based learning with Greedy policy searching in the Limit of
Infinite Exploration (GLIE) for MAMDPs is discussed in [56]:
Proposition 1. For the multi-agent Q-learning schemes obey-
ing the individual updating rule in (7) in a cooperative MAS
system, assume that the following conditions are satisfied:
• the learning rate αt decreases over time such that∑
t αt =∞ and
∑
t α
2
t <∞,
• each agent samples each of its actions infinitely often,
• the probability of agent i choosing action a ∈ Ai is
nonzero,
• the probability of taking a non-optimal action decreases
to 0 when t→∞ during the exploration stage,
let π∗i (t) be a random variable denoting the probability of
action-taking in a (deterministic) equilibrium strategy profile
being played at time t. Then for SAS-based learning, for any
ξ, ǫ > 0, there exists T (ξ, ǫ) such that
Pr(|π∗i (t)− 1| < ǫ) > 1− ξ, ∀t > T (ξ, ǫ). (12)
Although lacking a formal mathematical proof, Proposition
1 has been widely accepted in related studies [34], [57]. A
more general convergence condition for SAS-based learning
in MAS scenarios is given by [58]:
Proposition 2. In an MAS environment, an agent following
the updating rule in (7) will converge to the optimal response
Q-function with probability 1 as long as all the other agents
converge in behaviors with probability 1. If the agent follows
a GLIE policy and its best response policy is unique, it will
also converge in behavior with probability 1.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide theoretical support for the
convergence property of a number of SAS-based learning
algorithms that can be considered a variation of (7) (e.g.,
distributed Q-learning in cooperative MAMDPs [59] and pol-
icy hill-climbing in two-agent MAMDPs [60]). Again, it is
worth pointing out that for most MAS scenarios (e.g., general-
sum stochastic games) convergence of SAS-based learning
is not guaranteed. Furthermore, even when convergence can
be reached, it usually takes a significant amount of time for
merely determining switching between one pair of actions. As
a results, most of the practical SAS-based learning mecha-
nisms are limited in the special scenarios such as the fully-
cooperative MAS or two-agent MAS. In the framework of
the independent learning algorithm using standard Q-learning
[56], other SAS-based learning algorithms for MAS usually try
to eliminate the uncertainty caused by the actions of the other
agents while still retaining the distributivity of the decision-
making process. One typical example can be found in [59],
which projects the global Q-table of a deterministic MAMDP
(namely, the state transition is deterministic in the MDP) using
centralized Q-learning with joint action a = (a1, . . . , an),
Q(s, a), to the local Q-table of agent i with only local
action information ai, Q(s, ai). Following the standard Q-
learning rule, the projection-based independent learning adopts
an optimistic assumption that all the other agents will act
optimally. However, the learning result of such a distributed
algorithm is greedy with respect to the centralized Q-table with
the joint action. Additionally, its convergence when extended
to the scenarios of stochastic MAMDPs is not guaranteed
since it cannot discern the influence of the behaviors of the
other agents from that of the state dynamics. It is important to
note that without explicit coordination, which is at the cost of
losing the distributiveness of the decision-making process, all
the independent-learning-based algorithms will suffer for the
same reason as in the tightly coupled, MAS-based scenarios.
Despite all the limitations of independent learning, one
important benefit of adopting the disjoint learning processes
in the MAS is that it creates the opportunities of experience
sharing among individual agents. In [54], [61], the “implicit
imitation” mechanism by the observer agents is proposed to
incorporate the experience of the expert agents in the MAS.
Under the framework of distributed, independent MDPs, it is
frequently assumed that the learning agents are analogous to
each other in terms of state space, state transition and action
set [61]. Then experience transferring can be implemented
by modifying the estimated state-action value of the observer
agent based on the expertise evaluation of the mentor agents
and the weighted combination of their respective Q-values
[54]. When experience transferring is considered beyond the
framework of model-free learning and the model-based policy-
learning mechanism is adopted, the observer agent can also
implement the experience learning by maintaining the es-
timation of the mentor’s transition map from observation,
and incorporating the estimation into its own value-iteration
process [61].
C. Multi-Agent Strategy Learning in the Context of Games
In most of the practical scenarios, the dynamics of the multi-
agent MDP (e.g., the transition probabilities and the local
payoff) is determined by the joint policy of all the agents. To
facilitate distributed policy learning, the multi-agent MDP is
usually viewed as a Stochastic Game (SG). Mathematically, an
SG shares exactly the same 5-tuple structure as an MAMDP,
〈N ,S,A, {un}n∈N ,Pr(s′|s, a)〉. However, the goal of each
agent in the SG is to maximize its individual payoff [18].
Based on the definition of SGs, a repeated game can be
obtained as a 3-tuple, 〈N ,A=×An, {un}n∈N 〉, by fixing the
environment state as invariant while maintaining the objective
of each player as maximizing its individual discounted/average
payoff over the infinite time horizon. In the repeated game, the
system dynamics is reduced to only the mapping between the
action and the payoff: un : A → R. Further, when the repeated
game is played only once, it is reduced to a static game. In
return, any single shot of an SG or a repeated game is a static
game and is known as a single stage or one-shot game of the
original game [62].
9One important reason for adopting the game theoretic
models lies in the requirements that decisions are to be
made in a distributed manner with the limited ability of both
information acquisition and action coordination. This may be
either due to the overwhelming dimension of the state-action
space as the number of agents grows, or due to the overhead
for information exchange among agents. In the game-based
decision-making model, the individual-rationality property of
the agents leads to the concept of the best response. In an
SG, the best response of agent n is defined as the policy
{πn = Pr(s, an) : s ∈ S} such that the long-term payoff
under local policy πn is not worse than that under any other
local policies: Vn(πn, π−n) ≥ Vn(π′n, π−n), given the joint
adversary policy π−n. Here, π−n is the joint strategy of
the adversary agents except agent n and Vn can be either
the discounted long-term payoff or the average long-term
payoff. If ∀n ∈ N , the policy is a best response to the
joint strategy of the other agents, we say that the policy
profile (π1, . . . , π|N |) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) [18]. In the
context of games, the goal of policy learning now becomes
finding the policy updating rules for reaching a specific
equilibrium. Apart from the most commonly used solution
concept of NEs, a policy learning mechanism may resort to
other types of equilibria for the convenience such as ensuring
convergence or improving performance. In order to facilitate
our discussion on different learning algorithms, we provide the
formal definition of several equilibria in discounted-reward SG
G = 〈N ,S,A, {un}n∈N ,Pr(s′|s, a)〉 as follows:
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium (NE)). In a game G, an NE
point is a tuple of strategies (π∗1 , . . . , π∗|N|) such that ∀s ∈ S,
∀n ∈ N and ∀πn ∈ Πn,
Vβ,n(s, π
∗
1 ,. . .,π
∗
n. . .,π
∗
|N|)≥Vβ,n(s, π∗1 ,. . .,πn. . .,π∗|N|),
in which Vβ,n(s, π∗1 , . . . , π∗|N|) is given by (3) with a slight
abuse of notation.
Definition 3 (Correlated Equilibrium (CE)). In a game G, a
CE point is a joint strategy π∗ = (π∗n, π∗−n) such that ∀n ∈ N ,
∀s ∈ S and ∀an, a′n ∈ An,∑
a−n∈A−n
π∗(s, an, a−n)Q
pi∗
β,i(s, an, a−n) ≥∑
(an,a−n)∈A
π∗(s, an, a−n)Q
pi∗
β,i(s, a
′
n, a−n),
in which Qpi∗β,i(s, an, a−n) is given by (4) with a slight abuse
of notation and π∗(s, an, a−n) = π∗(s, a−n|an)π∗(s, an).
Definition 4 (ǫ-Equilibrium). Let ǫ > 0, the profile π∗ =
(π∗n, π
∗
−n) is an ǫ-equilibrium of game G if by following π∗
no player can improve its payoff by more than ǫ at any stage.
Specifically, given the condition of the NE (Definition 2),
π∗=(π∗n, π
∗
−n) is an ǫ-NE if ∀s ∈ S, ∀n ∈ N and ∀πn ∈ Πn,
Vβ,n(s, π
∗
n, π
∗
−n)≥Vβ,n(s,πn, π∗−n)− ǫ.
Given the condition of CE (Definition 3), π∗ = (π∗n, π∗−n) is
an ǫ-CE if ∀s ∈ S, ∀n ∈ N and ∀an, a′n ∈ An,∑
a−n∈A−n
π∗(s, an, a−n)Q
pi∗
β,i(s, an, a−n) ≥∑
(an,a−n)∈A
π∗(s, an, a−n)Q
pi∗
β,i(s, a
′
n, a−n)− ǫ.
Based on Definitions 2-4, the conditions of equilibria for
repeated/static games can be obtained in a similar way. From
the perspective of strategy derivation, a CE can be considered
a generalized form of an NE since it does not require the
individual player’s strategy to be independent with each other.
Although the adoption of a CE is recognized as being able to
provide a better performance of an NE, such a performance
improvement is usually at the cost of introducing an arbitrator
or coordinator into the game [18]. From the perspective of
convergence reaching, an ǫ-equilibrium can be considered a
form of both NE and CE with relaxed condition. For learning
algorithm design in repeated games, the introduction of ǫ-
equilibrium helps develop the learning mechanisms that guar-
antee the convergence to near-equilibrium with a limit-inferior
bound. However, it is worth noting that for a general SG,
the existence of a stationary ǫ-equilibrium is not guaranteed
beyond the case of two-player SGs [63].
According to the Folk theorem [36], for every infinite-
horizon, n-player, discounted repeated/stochastic game with
a finite number of actions, the existence of a stationary
policy π∗ as a subgame-perfect NE [18] is guaranteed. By
proving the existence of a subgame-perfect NE, the Folk
theorem implies that when compared with the static one-
shot game, policy learning may be able to obtain a better
payoff with the new NE in the repeated games. Such a benefit
is also considered a major motivation for the engineers to
adopt the game-based learning algorithms in the domain of
distributed decision-making. However, the implementations of
the learning algorithms heavily rely on the game structures
and the forms of the equilibria, and may differ significantly.
Within the past two decades, numerous methods have been
proposed for strategy learning in games. In order to facilitate
our survey on their applications in cognitive wireless networks,
we categorize the model-free learning algorithms along the
following dimensions5:
1) Value iteration vs. policy iteration: in SGs, most of
the learning algorithms based on the state-action value
estimation fall into the category of value-iteration based
algorithms. These algorithms include minimax Q-learning
[64], NSCP-learning [65] Nash Q-learning [66], Nash
R-learning [67] and CE-Q learning [68]. In contrary to
value-iteration-based learning, the policy-iteration-based
learning algorithms directly update the action-probability
vectors of each agent, using either the observation of the
adversary agents’ action pattern or the payoff received
from interaction with the environment. These algorithms
include standard Fictitious Play (FP) [33], asynchronous
best response [69], LA-based learning algorithms (e.g.,
5All the game-based learning methods to be discussed in the following
sections originate from these algorithms, and in Section III more details will
be provided for each of them.
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LR−I learning [47] and Bush-Mosteller learning [70]),
gradient-play-based better reply [71] and no-regret learn-
ing [72]. In the cases when both the strategy and the
local expected payoff are to be learned, the AC-like,
multiple-timescale learning algorithms [73] provide an
efficient strategy-learning approach (e.g., stochastic FP
[33]) for the agents. Further, when the joint action or the
payoff of the adversary agents is not directly observable,
conjecture-variation-based learning [74] works as an al-
ternative way of the aforementioned learning algorithms.
In the literature, these joint policy-value-iteration mech-
anisms for games are also known as the COmbined fully
DIstributed PAyoff and Strategy-Reinforcement Learning
(CODIPAS-RL) mechanisms [37].
2) NE vs. other equilibria: most of the learning algorithms
in 1) such as proposed in [47], [64]–[67], [69]–[71]
aim at finding the NE of the repeated games/SGs. By
contrast, the goal of CE-Q learning [68] and some no-
regret learning algorithms [72] is to learn the CE in
the SG and the repeated game, respectively. By relaxing
the condition of an NE from the profile of real actions
to the profile of agent beliefs, conjecture-variation-based
learning [74] converges to the conjecture equilibrium
[75]. In most practical scenarios based on the framework
of general repeated games, FP and stochastic FP only
guarantee that the ǫ-equilibrium can be reached [33]. In
the literature, ǫ-equilibrium is sometimes known as the
Logit equilibrium when the Logit function6 is used for
strategy updating.
3) Noncooperative games, cooperative games and team
games: technically, these three major categories cover
most of the game-based models in the applications
of distributed control. Provided that the noncooperative
games satisfy certain properties (e.g., being supermod-
ular/submodular [76] or having a unique NE), all of
the aforementioned learning algorithms in 1) and 2)
may ensure to reach one of the equilibria in the game.
For cooperative games, which are usually featured by
the process of bargaining or coalition formation among
agents, the Nash bargaining solution can be learned
through FP [37]. A team game is defined as the game
in which the agents share the common payoff function,
thus considered as a fully cooperative case of the general
SG-based games. Since every team game can be modeled
as a potential game [18], it is possible to apply best-
response-based learning [77], stochastic FP [76] or no-
regret learning [78] to learn the NE of a repeated team
game. In the case of team SGs, each agent can also be
associated with one single learning automaton at one
game state. Then by applying LR−I learning a pure-
strategy NE is guaranteed to be reached [79].
D. A Summary of Model-Free Learning Algorithms
Before proceeding to the next section, we provide a sum-
mary of the learning mechanisms that have been introduced in
this section in Figure 6. In Figure 6, the learning mechanisms
6About the definition of a Logit function, please refer to Section V-A3.
Value Iteration Policy Iteration
Q/R-Learning
SARSA
MAS Q/R-Learning
Minimax Q-Learning
Nash Q/R-Learning
CE-Q Learning
NSCP-Learning
Fictitious Play
Gradient Play
Asynchronous
Best Response
Learning Automata
No-Regret Learning
Actor-
Critic
Stochastic FP
Conjecture-
Variation
Fig. 6. A quick summary of the model-free learning algorithms.
TABLE VI
BRIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF MODEL-FREE LEARNING MECHANISMS
Learning
Mechanism
System Model Stability Property
Q/R-learning Single-agent MDP Optimality learning
SARSA Single-agent MDP Optimality learning
MAS Q/R-learning Multi-agent MDP Optimality learning
Minimax Q-
learning
Noncooperative SGs NE learning
Nash Q/R-learning Noncooperative SGs NE learning
CE Q-learning Noncooperative SGs CE learning
NSCP-learning Noncooperative SGs NE learning
FP Noncooperative
SGs/repeated games
ǫ-Equilibrium learning
Gradient play Noncooperative
repeated games
NE learning
Asynchronous Best
Response
Noncooperative/Team
repeated games
NE learning
LA Noncooperative/Team
repeated Games
ǫ-equilibrium learning
No-regret learning Noncooperative/Team
repeated games/SGs
NE/CE learning
Actor-critic
learning
Single/Multi-agent
MDP
Optimality learning
Stochastic FP Noncooperative
repeated games
NE learning
Conjecture-
variation-based
learning
Noncooperative
SGs/repeated games
ǫ-equilibrium learning
are categorized according to the experience updating approach
(i.e., value iteration or policy iteration) that they apply. In
Table VI, we further summarize the characteristics of these
learning mechanisms in terms of stability property and the
system models (SAS, MAS and games) that they are built
upon. Figure 6 and Table VI together provide a quick sketch
of the algorithms that are to be surveyed with respect to their
applications in cognitive wireless networks. More details of the
characteristics of each learning mechanism will be provided
in the following sections.
III. APPLICATIONS OF SINGLE-AGENT-BASED LEARNING
IN COGNITIVE WIRELESS NETWORKS
Thanks to the property of self-organization, a model-free
learner is able to reduce the level of required a-priori knowl-
edge about the network model as well as the level of overhead
due to explicit information exchange. It is also possible for
the learner to adapt quickly to the changes of the network
environment. As a result, model-free learning is particularly
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TABLE VII
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN NOTATIONS IN SECTION II-A
Symbol Meaning
O A finite set of observation states in a partially observ-
able Markov decision process
o A single observation state in a partially observable
Markov decision process
w(s) A weighting function to map a set of states s to a new
state for state abstraction
ct(s, a) or c Instantaneous cost function of a constrained MDP
λ Lagrange multiplier
suitable for resource management and scheduling problems
that demand self-exploration and self-organization of the net-
work devices. Starting from this section, we will provide
a comprehensive survey on the applications of model-free
learning across different protocol layers in cognitive wireless
networks following the broad-sense definition of CRNs. In a
nutshell, the survey on the applications of model-free learning
is organized based on the categorization of the learning mech-
anisms that is provided in Section II. According to the three
types of mathematical models for decision-making, Sections
III, IV and V are devoted to the applications of learning
algorithms based on single-agent systems, loosely coupled
multi-agent systems and game-based multi-agent systems,
respectively. The notations used in this section are summarized
in Table VII.
A. Applications of Learning in Single-Agent Systems
The early attempts in applying learning algorithms to wire-
less networking problems appeared even before the concept
of cognitive radios was proposed. Generally, the a-priori
knowledge of the environment evolution dynamics (e.g., the
transition probabilities of the MDPs) is not required by
the MDP-based, value-iteration learning schemes. Thus, the
schemes are widely applied to the problems in the time-
varying dynamics of the wireless environment that cannot be
perfectly sensed. These problems include dynamic packet rout-
ing [80], Dynamic Channel Assignment (DCA) [81], [82] and
joint radio resource management for multi-rate transmission
control in WCDMA networks [83], just to mention a few. The
strategy-learning schemes in these studies are featured by a
single/centralized agent, and are usually based on the standard
Q-learning algorithm given in (7). In early studies, the learning
schemes are built upon the simplified system models. Thus,
the issues such as the convergence conditions of the learning
schemes are still not the focus of the discussion. As a result,
the existence of Markovian property is simply assumed in
most of these works [81]–[83]. Also, in order to reduce the
complexity of the system model, the original MDPs modeling
the network dynamics are usually transformed into new MDPs
with reduced state-action space using state abstraction [84] or
Q-table projection methods. However, the equivalence between
the original MDPs and the re-transformed MDPs is generally
not guaranteed (see the example of [83]). In most of these
works (e.g., [80], [81]), the learning rules are designed in a
heuristic manner. Sometimes the standard Q-learning schemes
are modified by introducing the neural networks in order to
represent the table of the state-action values and approximate
the Q-value-updating function [80], [82], [83]. With these
simplifications, the convergence to an optimal strategy of the
learning schemes in these studies is also not guaranteed.
Among different approaches for simplifying the MDP-based
model of the network-control process, state abstraction [84]
becomes a necessary way of trading off optimality for the
efficiency of the single-agent-based learning mechanisms. The
necessity of state-action-space reduction lies in the need for
computational tractability of the learning schemes in the case
of state-action-space explosion. This is especially necessary
when a single agent is learning the strategy from a large set
of candidate actions in a system with a huge number of states.
In the context of networking problems, state abstraction maps
an original network-control model based on one MDP into
a new MDP with a smaller state-action set. Mathematically,
state abstraction in MDPs can be defined as follows:
Definition 5 (State abstraction [84]). For two MDPs M =
〈S,A, u,Pr(s′|s, a)〉 and M = 〈S,A, u,Pr(s′|s, a)〉, φ :
S → S is such a mapping that {φ−1(s)|s ∈ S} partitions
the state space S. Define a weighting function w : S → [0, 1],
where ∀s ∈ S,∑s∈φ−1(s) w(s) = 1. M is an abstracted MDP
of M , if the following conditions are satisfied:
u(s, a) =
∑
s∈φ−1(s)
w(s)u(s, a), (13)
and
Pr(s′|s, a) =
∑
s′∈φ−1(s′)
∑
s∈φ−1(s)
w(s) Pr(s′|s, a). (14)
However, the state-abstraction method generally requires
that the state transition in the new MDP with reduced com-
plexity to be well-defined. Namely, the linear-combination-
based mapping in (13) and (14) needs to be established and
the condition
∑
s′ Pr(s
′|s, a) = 1 needs to be satisfied. Since
with model-free learning, the transition models are generally
not known, it will be practically impossible to obtain an
accurate model of the reduced MDP. In order to address such
an issue, approximate abstraction is proposed in [85], [86].
In [85], [86], an on-policy reinforcement learning method,
SARSA, is applied to the DCA problem in a multi-cell, multi-
channel network with the consideration of handoffs. In the
considered cellular network, N cells provide M channels to
mobile stations, thus forming an N×(M+1)×M state-action
set. The arbitrary state-aggregation method proposed in [85],
[86] aggregates the rarely encountered states by reducing the
size of the channel state space to a fraction of the total number
of the channels. The state variable representing the number
of currently allocated channels is also excluded, which leads
to a 98% reduction from the original state-action space. A
more complicated state-action-space abstraction method can
be found in [83]. It adopts the feature extraction method
and maps the original state vector based on four dimensions,
namely, the mean and variance of the interference from the
existing connections, the transmission type and the required
transmission rate, into a vector of the resultant interference
profile. The feature extraction method is further adopted in
stochastic-game-based modeling for strategy learning in CRNs
[87], [88]. In [87], [88], the central spectrum moderator
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Fig. 7. Real-time video streaming process (adapted from [89]).
MAC QoS 
Computation
PHY QoS 
Computation
Layered Optimizer
)',,( PHYAppPHYApp sssV
State Transition
),|'(Pr APPAPPAPPAPP ass
Internal Policy
),( MACAPPPHYAPP ZssS
State Transition
),|'(Pr PHYPHYPHYPHY ass
External Policy
),,( PHYAPPPHYPHY assS
Layered Optimizer
),( AppPHYApp ssV
External Policy
),,( APPAPPPHYAPP assS
QoS Set
QoS Set
APP
MAC
PHY
MACZ
MACb
PHYb
)',,( PHYAppPHYApp sssV
Fig. 8. The operation and message exchange in the layered MDP (adapted
from [89]).
allocates the transmission opportunities to the CRs through an
iterative, second-price auction (see [18] for the definition of
auctions), whose dynamics is jointly determined by the Signal-
to-Noise-Ratio (SNR) of the channels and the buffer states
of all the CRs. In [87], [88], multi-stage bidding is adopted.
Since for each CR, the value of tax to be paid for using
the channels are based on the inconvenience it causes to the
other CRs, the individual CRs use their local tax announced
by the central spectrum moderator to classify the channel-
buffer states that the other (adversary) CRs are in. Therefore,
individual CRs only need to exchange the pricing information
with the central spectrum moderator, and no extra information
exchange between the CRs is required. In these works, the
feature extraction method does not only achieve the goal of
state abstraction, but also help avoid the explicit information
exchange between individual CRs.
With the development of MDP-based modeling in different
protocol layers of the wireless networks (see examples in
MAC layer [90], link layer [91] and application layer [92]),
the SAS-based learning mechanisms in the cognitive wireless
networks also gain more capabilities in addressing the radio
resource management problems. In [89], the problem of real-
time video transmission over a single-hop, slow-varying flat
fading channel is formulated as a systematic layered MDP
(see Figure 7 and Figure 8 for a schematic view of the
system and the corresponding layered MDP model). With the
proposed problem formulation, the discrete system state is
composed of three components, i.e., the SNR as the channel
state in the PHY layer, the transmission opportunity as the
state of the MAC layer and the amount of both the incoming
traffic and the buffered packets as the state of the applica-
tion layer (see Figure 8). The evolution of the joint state
(sAPP , sPHY ) is modeled as a Markov chain controlled by
the joint action (aAPP , aMAC , aPHY ), in which aMAC is
composed of two internal actions bPHY and bMAC . The joint
action is determined by the power allocation, the channel
resource payment made to the spectrum moderator and the
packet scheduling algorithm. The cross-layer management of
packet transmission is formulated as a layered MDP. This
is because for the Bellman optimality equation of the state
value, the Dynamic Programming (DP) based expression can
be decomposed into a two-loop DP-based optimization. In the
two-loop optimization, it is assumed that both layers have
access to the global state in each time slot. The inner loop
(i.e., the application-layer optimization) only needs to know
the joint MAC-application action and the reported state value
of the PHY layer for policy updating, while the outer loop
(i.e., the PHY-layer optimization) only needs to know the
PHY-layer action information and the reported state value
from the application layer for policy updating. The layered
Q-learning [93] can be applied to learn the optimal strategy
for transmission, with the standard Q-value updating rule in (7)
modified in each layer by incorporating the estimated Q-value
from the other layer into the estimation of the local Q-values.
Apart from lacking the a-priori knowledge about the statis-
tics of the underlying Markov process, the decision-making
entity in the network may frequently face the constraints on the
available resources. To tackle these constrained radio resource
allocation/scheduling problems, the unconstrained MDP mod-
els are extended to the Constrained MDPs (CMDPs), based
on which, modified reinforcement learning algorithms are
also proposed [94]–[99]. Mathematically, a CMDP is de-
fined by expanding the 4-tuple MDP model (Definition 1)
to be a 5-tuple, 〈S,A, u, c,Pr(s′|s, a)〉, with the additional
cost/constraint element c [100]. Taking the average-reward
CMDP as an example, a generic CMDP optimization problem
can be stated as follows:
max
pi
hpi(s)= lim
T→∞
sup
1
T
Epi
{
T−1∑
t=0
ut(st, at)
}
,
s.t. Cpi(s)= lim
T→∞
sup
1
T
Epi
{
T−1∑
t=0
ct(st, at)
}
≤Cmax.
(15)
According to Theorem 12.7 of [100], we have the following
theorem for the average-reward CMDP:
Theorem 1. If the underlying Markov chain of the CMDP,
〈S,A, u, c,Pr(s′|s, a)〉, is unichain and the sequence of the
immediate cost ct is bounded below and satisfies the following
13
growth condition:
for c : K → R there exists a sequence of increasing
compact subsets Ki of K such that ∪iKi = K and
limi→∞ inf{c(κ);κ /∈ Ki} =∞,
then there exists an optimal Lagrange multiplier λ∗ such
that the optimal solution of the CMDP is equivalent to the
optimal solution of the unconstrained MDP, 〈S,A, g = u −
λ∗c,Pr(s′|s, a)〉.
According to Theorem 1, the non-structured learning
schemes for the unconstrained MDP based on the Lagrangian
dual function can be developed for solving the resource
management/scheduling problems in the form of both R-
learning [95], [97], [99] and Q-learning [94], [98], [101],
depending on the form of the reward/cost of the CMDP.
Apart from the primal-dual equivalence based solution, it is
also possible to develop constrained learning algorithms by
exploiting the structure of the specific problems. The special
structure is featured by the convexity of the objective and
constraint functions in the original CMDP, or the modularity
of the objective or the constraint functions [98], [102]. When
certain structural property of the network control problems
is satisfied (specifically, when both the instantaneous payoff
and the constraint cost are multi-modular), the constrained
structured-learning algorithm can be applied in the form of
primal projection or submodular parameterization [102].
In addition to not knowing the environment evolution dy-
namics and being limited by the resource constraints, the
learning agents in a wireless network may also lack the
ability of complete state-information acquisition. This can
be a common issue in scenarios such as DSA networks, in
which the secondary devices lack the capability of performing
full-spectrum sensing due to the limited number of antennas
[109]. The common approach to handle such a problem is to
model the radio resource management problem as a Partially
Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). Extending
from Definition 1, an unconstrained POMDP can be defined
as a 6-tuple, 〈S,O,A, u,Pr(s′|s, a),Pr(o|s, a)〉, in whichO is
the set of observations o, and Pr(o|s, a) denotes the mapping
probability between the system states and the observations.
Instead of directly observing the state information of s, the
learning agent can only obtain the network observation o.
In the POMDPs, the random process associated with the
observation is no longer a Markov process. A standard model-
based solution to the POMDP is to convert the recorded state
observations into belief states, and obtain a new unconstrained
MDP with a continuous state space of the belief states.
However, when the state-transition and the state-observation
mapping is unknown, the TD-based learning schemes cannot
be directly used for learning the optimal strategies of the
POMDPs. Instead, other learning algorithms such as actor-
critic learning [110] and policy-gradient-based learning [111]
are applied. In [105], a delay-constrained least-cost routing
problem in MANETs is modeled as a POMDP, the belief
state of which captures the link-delay uncertainty due to the
imprecise link state information. The belief-policy mapping
is considered as a parametric function, the policy parameter
of which is learned through a standard actor-critic learning
method. In [107], to solve the DSA problem in a CRN, the
channel access process of the Secondary Users (SUs) is first
modeled as a constrained POMDP. In the constrained POMDP,
a reward function is used to collect the instantaneous reward of
the SUs, while a cost function reflects the instantaneous cost
of the Primary Users (PUs) due to the channel interference
from the SUs. The partial observation in the problem comes
from the imperfect spectrum sensing of the SUs over the pri-
mary channel state. After converting the original constrained
POMDP into an unconstrained POMDP with the help of the
Lagrange multiplier, the learning algorithm based on policy
gradient [111] is applied for finding a local optimal policy.
To summarize this section, we categorize in Table VIII
the aforementioned works (and some more) on SAS learning
according to the networking applications that they focus on. As
shown by Table VIII, the SAS-based learning algorithms are
powerful in addressing a number of radio resource allocation
problems, as long as they can be formulated as a single-link-
centric one. However, it is worth noting that although the
theoretical support for the convergence of the SAS-learning
schemes has been well studied, such an issue still needs to be
addressed under practical circumstances.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF LEARNING BASED ON LOOSELY
COUPLED MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
The multi-agent learning scheme naturally leads to the
framework of distributed decision making, thus the possibility
of self-organization without a dedicated central coordinator.
Therefore, it is considered especially appropriate for the net-
work management problems in the CRNs, device-to-device
(D2D) networks, heterogeneous networks (HETNETs) and ad-
hoc networks, as long as the networks consist of multiple
independent decision-making entities. However, although the
framework of distributed decision making naturally leads to
the consideration of adopting the multi-agent decision learn-
ing scheme for network control, it is worth noting that for
most cases it may be difficult to directly adopt the learning
mechanisms based on the loosely coupled MAS by simply
ignoring the interactions between the network entities and treat
each of them as an independent learner. Due to the existence
of device interaction, it is necessary to carefully investigate
into both the advantage and the limitation of formulating
a distributed network control problem as a loosely coupled
MAS. Furthermore, when adopting the model of learning in
the loosely coupled MAS, it is still necessary to check to
what level the information exchange between the learning
agents is needed, and in what ways it can help improving
the performance of the network.
The new notations used in this section are summarized by
Table IX.
A. Applications of Distributed Learning Based on the Model
of Loosely Coupled Multi-Agent Systems
For distributed learning in wireless networks, it is usually
difficult to definitely classify between a non-game-based,
multi-agent decision learning scheme and an SG-based learn-
ing scheme. The reason for this lies in the inherited nature of
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TABLE VIII
APPLICATIONS OF SAS-BASED LEARNING SCHEMES IN COGNITIVE WIRELESS NETWORKS: A SUMMARY
Network Type Application Problem
Formulation
Reference Learning Scheme Learning Scheme Varia-
tion
Convergence
Cellular
Dynamic channel
allocation
MDP [81],
[82], [85],
[86], semi-
MDP [103]
[81], [82],
[85], [86],
[103]
Q-learning [81], [82],
[103], SARSA [85],
[86]
Neural Network [82],
State abstraction [85],
[86], N/A [103]
N/A
Multirate transmis-
sion control
MDP [83] Q-learning Neural network with fea-
ture extraction [83]
N/A
Call admission con-
trol
CMDP [94],
[101]
Q-learning [94],
[101]
State abstraction [94],
[101]
N/A
Joint admission-
bandwidth control
CMDP [99],
[104]
Q-learning [104],
Neural network [99]
N/A N/A
Single link
Cross-layer
resource allocation
Layered-
MDP
[89], [93] Layered Q-learning
[89]
Virtual experience tuples
[93]
N/A
Scheduling-
admission control
CMDP [96] Stochastic sub-
gradient
N/A Deterministic optimal
policy [96]
V-BLAST power-
rate control
CMDP [102] Q-learning Constrained structured Q-
learning
Randomized optimal
policy
MANETs QoS routing POMDP [105] Actor-critic learning N/A N/A
CRNs
Dynamic spectrum
access
MDP [106],
CMDP
[95], [97],
POMDP
[107]
[95],
[97],
[106],
[107]
Actor-critic learning
[106], R-learning
[95], [97], policy
gradient [107]
N/A [95], [106], [107],
Arbitrary state reduction
[97]
Deterministic optimal
policy [95], N/A [97],
[106], Local optimum
policy [107]
HETNETs Vertical handoff CMDP [98] Q-learning N/A Optimal randomizedpolicy
Admission control MDP [108] Q-learning Q-learning based on
neural-fuzzy-inference
network
N/A
TABLE IX
SUMMARY OF THE NEW NOTATIONS IN SECTION IV
Symbol Meaning
γ
i,F
r The received SINR for femto/pico link i over resource
block r
P iFr The transmit power of femto/pico BS
gFFii,r The link gain between the femto/pico BS and its user
gMFii,r The link gain between the macro BS and the femto/pico
user
σ2 noise power
I[x] or
I(x, y)
The indicator function
wi(j) or
w′i(j)
The weight assigned by agent i for its neighbor j’s
instantaneous reward or estimated state value
Y The social reward of a group of agents
y The private reward that an individual agent chooses
strategy coupling in most of the practical networking problem
setups. One typical example is illustrated in [113], [114],
which consider that L macrocells and N femtocells/picocells
operate over the same frequency band (see Figure 9) in a
HETNET. In order to develop a self-organized power allo-
cation scheme for the downlink transmission in the HETNET,
the Shannon capacity of a link is considered as the individ-
ual utility of a cell, which is a function of the Signal-to-
Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (SINR) of the transmitting link
in that cell. Take the femtocells/picocells as an example, when
both the intra-cell interference and the cross-tier interference
are considered, for femotocell/picocell link i, the SINR at the
receiver is determined as follows:
γi,Fr =
P i,Fr g
FF
ii,r∑L
j=1 P
j,M
r gMFji,r +
∑N
k=1,k 6=i P
i,F
r gFFki,r + σ
2
, (16)
where P i,Fr is the transmit power of femto/pico Base Station
(BS) i over the resource block r, gFFii,r is the link gain between
Fig. 9. Structure of a HETNET with both inter-cell and cross-layer inter-
ference. A HETNET is featured by the hierarchy in the network structure,
which is comprised by the high-power, high-capacity, wide-range macrocells
and the low-power, low-capacity, small-range femtocells/picocells [112].
the femto/pico BS and its user, gMFji,r is the link gain between
macro BS j and the femto/pico user, gFFki,r is the link gain from
another femto/pico BS k to the user of femto/pico BS i, and
σ2 is the noise power.
Apparently, the capacity of femto/pico link i is determined
not only by the transmit power of femto/pico BS i, P i,Fr , but
also by the inter-cell interference
∑N
k=1,k 6=i P
i,F
r g
FF
ki,r and the
cross-tier interference
∑L
j=1 P
j,M
r g
MF
ji,r . Therefore, the private
utility of femto/pico link i is also a function of the strategy of
the other femto/pico BS k (k = 1, . . . , n, k 6= i) and all the
macro BSs j (j = 1, . . . , L). The goal of the local cells for
maximizing the individual utilities conflicts with each other,
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and it is difficult to decompose the strategy coupling between
the cells. As a result, many works formulate the same problem
as a noncooperative repeated game [115], [116]. However,
it is still possible to tackle such a power control problem
by treating the strategies of the other BSs as part of the
environment dynamics. For example, in [113] the system state
from the perspective of a femto/pico link is designed as a
binary one:
Ii,rt =
{
1, if γi,Fr,t < γTh,
0, otherwise, (17)
which is based on hard thresholding (compared with the
permitted SINR given as γTh) of the macrocell user with the
interference from the femto/pico links. The similar network-
state formulation can be found in the other works such as
[114]. By adopting a standard Q-learning scheme based on
the assumption of independent state-value evolution, it is
assumed in [113], [114] that the dynamics of the aggregated
interference to the macrocell user is a stationary Markov
process. Consequently all the strategies of the other femto/pico
users are treated as stationary ones hence part of the wireless
environment. In most of the cases, such a formulation/solution
with the distributed MDPs and independent Q-learning algo-
rithm may not guarantee the convergence to any equilibrium.
However, empirical studies show that when using the dis-
tributed Q-learning scheme, convergence can still be achieved
given a sufficiently large number of iterations [113], [117],
[118], and the distributed Q-learning algorithm is also able to
achieve a better performance compared with the non-adaptive
algorithms [114], [117], [118]. Although not mathematically
proved, one possible explanation for such a result may lie
in Proposition 2, since one independent Q-learning agent is
always able to converge as long as the other agents happen to
converge in behavior.
Generally, for the network management problems with
strategy coupling, directly adopting the distributed learning
schemes in the loosely coupled MAS (e.g., multi-agent learn-
ing in the form of distributed, independent Q-learning) can
be considered as an approach that trades off the certainty of
algorithm convergence for the simplicity of system analysis
and learning-rule design. Except for heterogeneous networks,
applications that follow such a design pattern can be found
in the problem formulation such as distributed DSA with the
SU collisions [119]–[121], power allocation in the overlay,
cognitive wireless mesh network [122] and dynamic spectrum
management in 4G cellular networks [123]. Although with
many studies that adopt such a design pattern for the learning
schemes, it is important to reiterate that overlooking strategy
coupling may result in poor performance of each learning
agent. In [124], a problem of DSA management with 2 SUs
over 2 primary channels (see Figure 10) is used to exemplify
how the lack of coordination between individual agents may
impact the agent performance. In [124], the availability of a
primary channel is modeled as a two-state discrete Markov
chain. The SUs try to access the idle primary channel while
avoiding the collision with the other SU. The adaptation of the
channel-access strategies is formulated as a POMDP, in which
the observation of an SU includes 3 states: busy, collision and
Fig. 10. Illustration of the interference map for the two-SU-two-PU DSA
network [124].
success. Based on the assumption that the presence of the
other SU can be ignored, a model-based single-user approach
for strategy updating is proposed. When compared with the
cooperative approach, which allows the SUs to exchange
their belief state vectors of the POMDP, the performance of
the single-user-based approach is shown to be significantly
inferior. Moreover, the simulation results in [124] show that the
performance of the single-agent-based approach is even worse
than that of the deterministic channel-assignment scheme,
which indicates that in the situation of strategy coupling,
allowing some degree of cooperation will be essential.
In order to balance between the simplicity of the learning
mechanism (namely, the distributiveness of strategy learning)
and the optimality of the learning algorithm, careful modeling
is needed with respect to different network scenarios. In [125],
a set of decision-learning mechanisms based on distributed
Q-learning is adopted for a scalable DSA mechanism in an
overlay CRN. The goal of the learning mechanism design
is to obtain the near-optimal strategies without the explicit
coordination among the SUs. It is shown in [125] that by
properly designing the private/local objective functions of the
individual SUs, the needs of both agent coordination and
distributed decision-learning can be fulfilled. In [125], the
SUs are assumed to share the temporarily free band roughly
equally. It means that the reward of an individual SU with
DSA, ui(t), is approximately equal to the average of the social
reward of all the SUs that attempt to use the same primary
band (denoted by Y (t)):
ui(t)=
1
|Ni(t)|+1Y (t)=
1
|Ni(t)|+1
|Ni(t)|+1∑
i=1
ui(Ni(t)),
(18)
where Ni(t) is the set of SUs that interfere with SU i over
the same band at time t. The PU activity is also modeled as a
two-state Markov chain. In [125], two guidelines are proposed
for designing the private/individual objective function of each
SU:
1) alignedness, which reflects agent coordination, and the
full alignedness requires the SUs not working against
each other when maximizing their own private objectives;
2) sensitivity, which reflects the efficiency of the individual
learning processes and requires the SUs to be able to
discern the impact of their own action changes so as to
learn about the better local strategies fast enough.
In [125], the measurable indices of “factoredness” and
“learnability” are introduced to measure alignedness and sen-
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sitivity of the private objective function, respectively. Denoting
the selected private objective function as yi (yi may not be the
same as ui) and the joint deterministic strategy by the SUs over
the same band as π = (πi, π−i), the degree of factoredness and
learnability can be expressed as in (19) and (20), respectively:
Fyi =
∑
pii
∑
pi−i
I[(yi(π)−yi(π ′)) (Y (π)−Y (π ′))]∑
pii
∑
pi−i
1
, (19)
Li,yi(π) =
Epi′ [|yi(π)− yi(π−i, π′i)|]
Epi′−i [|yi(π)− yi(π−i, π′i)|]
, (20)
where I[x] is the indicator function, I[x] = 1 if x > 0 and
I[x] = 0 otherwise, and Fyi (0 ≤ Fyi ≤ 1) measures the
consistence between the local objective and the social payoff.
The higher the degree of factoredness (i.e., the value of Fyi )
is, the more likely a change of the local action by SU i
will have the same impact on both its private reward and the
global reward. Li,yi measures the sensitivity of local reward
to the local action changes. According to (20), the higher the
sensitivity (i.e., the learnability), the more the dependence of
yi(π) on the local actions of SU i. By employing the property
described by (18), namely, the private reward yi(t) = ui(t)
being proportional to the global reward Y (t), it is shown
in [125] that a good objective function can be obtained by
removing from Y (t) the effects of all SUs other than SU
i. A general form of such a local objective function can be
expressed as follows:
Di(π) = Y (π)− Y (π−i). (21)
Since ui(t) is a function of both Y (t) and the cardinality of the
interfering-SU set Ni(t), all that SU i needs to obtain the value
of Di is to estimate |Ni(t)| given the information that SU i
observes locally. It is shown that with the proposed objective
function (21), the distributed learning scheme achieves better
spectrum efficiency than those learning with both private re-
ward and global reward. From the game theoretic perspective,
spectrum access with the individual reward as in (18) can be
interpreted as a cardinal potential game [18], in which (21)
is in the exact form of a potential function. In this sense, the
design of the objective function in [125] can be considered as
a special case of global-reward-based learning, and may not
be easily extended to a general radio resource management
problem such as [113], [114]. Although the two indices in
(19) and (20) provide important guidelines on individual utility
function design for distributed learning, it is still needed to
find appropriate approaches other than that given by (18) for
the networking applications which cannot be modeled as a
potential game.
Instead of designing a different objective function, the
learning scheme itself can also be tailored to meet the require-
ment of radio resource management. One example of learning
scheme design in the strategy-coupling scenario is provided by
[126], which studies an Aloha-like spectrum access scheme
without any negotiation in a multi-user, multi-channel CRN
(Figure 11). In [126], N primary channels are modeled as
N independent, two-state Markov chains, while the SUs are
assumed to have no mutual communication and need to learn
the collision-avoidance strategies online. Instead of adopting
Fig. 11. Channel access competition and conflict in an Aloha-like multi-user-
multi-channel CR system [126].
the standard state-value evolution model given in (4) and
the TD-based strategy-learning mechanism given in (7), the
expected one-time reward is adopted as (22):
Qsij = E[ui|ai(t) = j, s(t) = s], (22)
and a learning mechanism without considering the future
reward is designed as (23):
Qsij(t+1)=(1−αij(t))Qsij(t)+αij(t)ui(t)I(ai(t), j). (23)
In (22) and (23), ai(t) = j represents the action of SU i to
select channel j for transmission, s is the vector of the channel
states, αij(t) is the learning step, ui(t) is the instantaneous
reward of SU i and I(x, y) is the indicator function (i.e.,
I(x, y) = 0 if x 6= y and I(x, y) = 1 if x = y). Although
(23) appears in a similar form to distributed Q-learning, it
is derived based on the analysis of the channel contention
as an SG. It is shown in [126] that with the Boltzmann
distribution-based strategy exploration, the learning scheme in
(23) is equivalent to the Robbins-Monro iteration [127] and
converges asymptotically to a stationary point (i.e., an NE)
with probability one.
Generally, the aforementioned multi-agent learning schemes
can be divided into two categories, namely, distributed learning
based on the assumption of purely independent state-value
evolution (e.g., [113], [114], [117]–[123]) and distributed
learning based on the structural property of the specific re-
source management problems (e.g., [125], [126]). Although
both of them do not require explicit information exchange
among network devices, sometimes introducing a certain level
of information exchange (at the cost of more overhead) can
help improve the network performance. In the literature, the
learning schemes with explicit information exchange is usually
referred to as learning based on Distributed Value Function
(DVF). With DVF, local devices are required to share their
state-value/reward functions with the neighbors. Instead of
learning the Q-value based on the individual reward or local
state values, individual decision making aims at the maxi-
mization of both the local and the neighbors’ weighted sum
of rewards/state-values. By modifying (7), a typical learning
mechanism with DVF can be expressed as
Qt+1i (si, ai)←(1 − αt)Qti(si, ai)+
αt
(
uti(si, ai) + β
∑
j∈N (i)
wi(j)Vj(sj)
)
,
(24)
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TABLE X
APPLICATIONS OF INDEPENDENT-LEARNER LEARNING SCHEMES IN COGNITIVE WIRELESS NETWORKS: A SUMMARY
Network Type Application Reference Strategy Coupling As-
sumptions
Learning Scheme Convergence
CRNs
Aggregated interference
control
[117] None Independent Q-learning for MDP
and neural network for POMDP
[117]
N/A
Joint spectrum and power
management
[119],
[122]
None [119], coupling as
a noncooperative game
[122]
Independent Q-learning [119],
[122]
N/A
Dynamic spectrum access [120],
[123],
[125],
[126]
None [120], [123], cou-
pling with fully con-
nected topology [125],
Coupling as a noncoop-
erative game [126]
Independent Q-learning [120],
Win-or-Learn-Fast (WoLF)
[123], Independent learning
(unspecified) [125], Modified
independent Q-learning without
considering the future states
[126]
N/A [120],
[123], near
optimal strategy
[125] or NE
[126]
Joint sensing-time and
power allocation
[121] None Independent Q-learning N/A
HETNETs Femto-user power alloca-tion
[113] None Independent Q-learning N/A
Inter-cell interference coor-
dination
[114] None Independent Q-learning N/A
Sensor
networks
Coverage and energy con-
sumption management
[128] Coordinated decision-
making
DVF-based learning N/A
Cooperative
networks
Power and relaying proba-
bility management
[129] Coordinated decision-
making
Q-learning based on distributed
reward and value function,
Local optimal
point
Cellular
networks
Power allocation and expe-
rience sharing
[130] Coordinated decision-
making
DVF-based learning N/A
in which N (i) is the set of device i’s neighbors (including
i) and wi(j) is the weight that determines the contribution of
device j’s state-value to device i’s estimation of Vi.
The applications of the DVF-based learning mechanism
in wireless networks can be found in [128]–[130]. In [128],
DVF-based learning is used in an ad-hoc sensor network to
coordinate the sensing and hibernation operation as the state of
the grid-point coverage changes. To encourage the sensor node
with a larger coverage area to perform the sensing operation,
the individual reward is designed as a function of the number
of the covered grid points. It is shown that DVF-based learning
outperforms the independent learner-based learning algorithm,
especially under the condition of high sensor node densities.
In [129], a learning algorithm based on the exchange of both
the instantaneous reward and the estimated local state-value
is proposed for the joint power control and relay selection
in a distributed cooperative network. The proposed learning
scheme is featured by weighting over both the instantaneous
reward and the estimated local state-value that are shared
by the neighbor nodes, and thus is called learning with the
Distributed Reward and Value (DRV) function. By extending
(24), the rule of learning with DRV can be expressed as
follows:
Qt+1i (si, ai)←(1 − αt)Qti(si, ai)+
αt
( ∑
j∈N (i)
w′i(j)u
t
j(sj , aj) + β
∑
j∈N (i)
wi(j)Vj(sj)
)
,
(25)
in which w′i(j) and wi(j) are the weight of node i given
to its neighbor j’s instantaneous reward and estimated state
value, respectively. With the learning scheme given in (25),
each node in the network maintains a vector of both the
channel/buffer state of its direct link and the channel/buffer
state of its cooperative link. It is shown in [129] that learning
based on sharing both the instantaneous rewards and the local
state values can achieve a better power efficiency than that
using only the local reward or the local state value information.
In [130], the DVF-based learning scheme is adopted in a real-
time multimedia cellular network to adapt the power allocation
of interfering links. In addition to coordinating the individual
links, the Q-value updating mechanism (24) is also used to
improve the convergence of the newly adopted links in the
network.
In Table X, we categorize the works discussed in this
subsection according to their respective applications. For
applications of multi-agent independent-learning schemes in
wireless networks, convergence of learning remains an open
issue in most of the existing studies. Compared with the
SAS-based learning algorithms, adopting independent learning
schemes requires more attention for any specific networking
optimization problem.
B. Experience Sharing Based on Distributed Learning
Apart from improving the expected network performance
with shared information in the form of structured reward/state-
value functions (e.g., using the social reward and the
DVF/DRV functions), another consideration in MAS-based
learning is whether information sharing can also help the
individual learning agents to speed up their learning processes.
To answer this question, it is necessary to investigate into
the homogeneity of the distributed learning processes so that
we can check whether one learning process may be able
to benefit from the “shared experience” offered by another
learning process, and furthermore, in what form such a “shared
experience” would be.
We call a group of distributed learning processes homo-
geneous when the distributed learning agents apply the same
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Fig. 12. Docitive cycle which extends the cognitive cycle by cooperative
teaching (adapted from [133]).
learning method with an evolution determined by exactly the
same stochastic process. In the framework of homogeneous
learning processes, it is possible for individual agents to share
their private experience (e.g., strategies, estimated Q-values)
with the other agent in order to accelerate the learning process
and improve the performance. Recently, the possibility of
applying the teacher-pupil paradigm in human cognition to
solve the wireless networking problems has been discussed in
a series of studies [131]–[134]. In these pioneering studies,
the paradigm of “docitive network” was proposed based on
the extension of distributed cognitive networks (Figure 12). In
the framework of docitive networks, “docition” (teaching) is
performed by a more experienced network agent to accelerate
the learning process of the other agents. Depending on the
degree of docition among the wireless devices, the teaching-
learning process can be distinguished into 3 categories [131]:
• Startup docition: each wireless node learns independently.
When a new node joins the network, instead of learning
from zero experience, it learns the policies from docitive
nodes which have already acquired a certain level of
expertise on strategy selection.
• Adaptive docition: the nodes exchange information about
the performance of their learning processes. The docitive
nodes share policies and the learning nodes learn from
the expert neighbors which have the best performance.
• Perfect docition: each node in the network is able to ob-
serve the joint action and all individual rewards. Based on
the observation, every docitive node models its interaction
with the rest of the network as a complete centralized
MDP separately and selects its individual actions.
The basic prerequisite for implementing docition in any net-
working problems is that the individual learning processes can
be modeled as parallel, homogeneous MDPs, through which
imitating the strategies of the docitive nodes by the learning
nodes will not influence the policies of the docitive nodes.
However, empirical studies have shown that relaxing such a
constraint in the situation of a noncooperative game-like sce-
nario may also help improve the performance of the learning
nodes [132], [134], [135]. In [132], the distributed downlink
power allocation problem in an IEEE 802.22 WRAN (underlay
to the TV-Broadcasting bandwidth) is studied. An aggregated
interference model from the SUs to the PU is considered. The
channel state experienced by the individual SUs is defined by
a binary state according to hard thresholding on the aggregated
interference, which is similar to (17). Each secondary BS
ignores the impact of the other BSs on the channel state and
adopts a standard independent Q-learning scheme to learn its
own power selection strategy. The docition process is based
on exchanging the Q-tables among the neighbor secondary
BSs. In this case, the learning nodes perform either the startup
docition or the adaptive docition periodically by adopting
the Q-tables of the expert nodes with the best performance.
The simulations in [132] show that the docitive paradigm
significantly speeds up the learning process with respect to the
case of independent learners. A similar approach is adopted
in [134], [135], which study the power allocation problem
in self-organized heterogeneous networks with femotocells.
In these studies, a cross-tier interference model is adopted
in a manner similar to (16), while strategy coupling among
the femto links is also ignored by individual learners. Again,
here docition is performed through exchanging the Q-tables
among the neighbor nodes. In [134], the similarity metric to
measure of the correlation between the femto BS strategy and
the aggregated interference to the macrocell is introduced as
a user-defined gradient. The proposed metric measures the
similarity of the policies between two neighbor nodes. With
the similarity metric, the learning nodes can not only adopt the
Q-tables from the neighbor nodes with the best performance,
but also take into account the degree of the similarity between
their own action-state correlation and their neighbors’.
While it is relatively easy to implement docition in the
framework of independent Q-learning based on the model of
parallel, homogeneous MDPs, it generally remains an open
issue to estimate the similarity of the policies between two
neighbor learners when the learning processes are heteroge-
neous. Especially, in the scenario of strategy coupling and
interest conflict, imitating the strategies or the Q-tables of
the adversary neighbor node with the best performance may
result in strategy oscillation. Such a situation can be illustrated
by revisiting the power allocation problem defined by (16).
In the simplified situation of mutual interference with only
two femto BSs, increasing the transmit power of one BS
will result in the performance deterioration for the other BS,
because the interference to the other BS is also increased.
Consider the case that the BS with the smaller transmit power
decides to adopt the strategy of its rival BS by increasing
its transmit power. If independent Q-learning is used by both
BSs to learn their power selection strategies, the other BS will
soon discover that it will benefit from increasing its current
transmit power too. This creates an “arm race” situation in
which each BS begins to increase its transmit power in turn
until both the BSs reach their maximum power level, which is
a typical situation of the prisoner’s dilemma in noncooperative
games. Such an unwanted situation can be avoided if both BSs
treat the power allocation process as a noncooperative game
and adopt the learning methods in games such as Fictitious
Play (FP) and best response without any docition procedure7.
As a result, in works such as [137] the docitive paradigm
and the game-based learning paradigm are considered two
controversial frameworks for strategy learning. However, it is
worth noting that with emerging techniques such as transfer
7Studies adopting the same mutual interference model as in (16) within
the framework of repeated games can be found in [136]. In [136], the best
response without docition ensures the convergence to the Pareto dominant
equilibria.
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TABLE XI
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN NOTATIONS IN SECTION V
Symbol Meaning
κti(a−i) The statistic of player i for its opponent’s actions
θti(a−i) The estimated probability of player i for its opponent
to play action a−i
BR(·) The set of best-response actions
ν The learning parameter for perturbation in SFP
αt The learning factor in SFP
qti(a) The estimated frequency of local actions
ǫt The time-varying step size in GP
µ, µt The learning parameters in GP, LA and no-external-
regret learning
pi The probability of accessing a channel in a random
medium access game
Rm The transmit rate over channel m
Ri(πi, ai|a−i) The regret of player i for playing strategy π instead
of playing ai
Rti(a
t
i , a
′
i) The regret for agent i not playing a′i at time t
cti(s, a−i) The conjecture of opponent policy π−i(s) by agent
i at time t
πti(s, ai) The reference point for conjecture learning
learning [138] and experience-weighted attraction learning
[139], incorporating the teaching process in the game-based
framework of learning is no longer impossible. For this part,
we will leave the discussion of more details to Section VI.
V. APPLICATIONS OF GAME-BASED LEARNING IN
COGNITIVE WIRELESS NETWORKS
Generally, there are the limitations of the distributed learn-
ing mechanisms (e.g., the algorithms reviewed in IV) that
post the necessity of introducing the game-based learning
mechanisms in CRNs. By modeling distributed network con-
trol problems as games, it is possible to better address the
problems raised by device interactions in the networks. Also,
it is possible to design learning schemes that theoretically
guarantee the convergence of the individual strategies to a
fixed point or equilibrium, while such convergence is usually
not guaranteed by the distributed learning mechanisms. In this
section, we consider the repeated games as the special cases
of SGs and introduce the applications of learning algorithms
based on repeated games and SGs separately. We will organize
the learning algorithms based on the three game property
dimensions discussed in Section II-C. Our major focus will be
(a) the rules in each learning scheme; (b) the conditions and
properties of the games with which a specific learning scheme
may converge; and (c) the degree of information exchange
required by each learning scheme to achieve convergence. The
new notations used by this section can be found in Table XI.
A. Applications of Learning in the Context of Repeated Games
Repeated games play an important role in problem for-
mulation for distributed network control. When the network
evolution is not subject to a stochastic environment, most
of the network control problems that requires considering
the interactions among distributed devices can be formulated
as a repeated game instead of an MAMDP. In contrast to
the MDP-based learning mechanisms that heavily depend on
value iteration, policy iteration now plays an important role
in deriving the learning rules for repeated games. In the
context of repeated games, model-free learning emphasizes
more on the situation of information locality. This is because
in many practical scenarios, the information of the local
utilities, actions or strategies of one network device may not
be available to the other devices due to either the concern
of privacy or the lack of enough resources for information
exchange. In this subsection, we will organize our survey
on the applications of learning in repeated games according
to the prototypical learning schemes that they are based on.
These prototypical learning schemes include (i) fictitious play,
(ii) gradient play, (iii) learning automata and (iv) no-regret
learning.
1) Fictitious Play and Stochastic Fictitious Play: The basic
prerequisite of the standard FP is that the agents are willing
to reveal their (discrete) action information to the others after
each round of play, so they can track the frequency of action
selection by the other agents [33]. With FP, agent i assesses
the distribution of its opponent’s actions at round t as follows:
κti(a−i) = κ
t−1
i (a−i) + I(a
t−1
−i , a−i). (26)
Agent i estimates the probability for the opponent agents to
play the joint action a−i at round t as:
θti(a−i) =
κti(a−i)∑
a′−i∈A−i
κti(a
′
−i)
. (27)
In this sense, FP is sometimes considered as a model-based
learning mechanism since with (27) it tries to build the model
of the opponents’ joint policy from accumulated experience.
However, compared with other model-based, non-learning
mechanisms such as dynamic programming for MDPs, FP
does not need any a-priori knowledge of the system or other
players. Based on (27), FP is defined as any rule that assigns
the best response to agent i given its current estimation of
the opponent policy θti(a−i). Usually, such an operation is
represented by ati(a−i) ∈ BRi(θti(a−i)), where the operator
BR(·) derives the best-response action set. Typically, BRi can
be derived by maximizing the estimated expected payoff of
agent i: BRi(θti(a−i)) = argmaxa∈Ai E[ui(a, θti(a−i))]. The
convergence property of FP in a general repeated game is given
by Theorem 2 [33].
Theorem 2 (Convergence of FP). 1) Strict NE8 are the
absorbing state for the process of fictitious play. 2) Any pure-
strategy steady state of fictitious play must be an NE.
Theorem 2 gives the sufficient condition for FP to converge
to an NE. Thereby, the convergence of FP-based learning is
guaranteed in any repeated games that possess at least one
pure-strategy NE. According to Theorem 2, a typical way of
checking the convergence condition for FP in a game is to
check if the game possesses certain properties (such as being
potential or S-modular [18]) that guarantee the existence of a
pure-strategy NE.
As long as the learning agents are able to observe the actions
of the rival agents or afford the overhead for action information
exchange, FP can be employed as the basic solution for many
resource management games in wireless networks. In [140],
8This is equivalent to the condition when the best-response payoffs in the
NE are strictly greater than the other possible payoffs for all the agents.
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an FP-based multi-agent learning algorithm is employed by
the secondary nodes in an ad-hoc DSA network to learn
the strategies for forwarding delay-sensitive packets. In [140]
the condition of channel availability is characterized by the
matrix of spectrum opportunity, and the condition of channel
contention is characterized by the interference matrix from
both the PUs and the rival SUs. With the learning scheme
proposed in [140], each SU needs to collect the information
about the spectrum opportunity matrix locally, and establish
its local interference matrix according to the action infor-
mation collected from its neighbors. Then, every SU tracks
the frequency of action selection by its neighbors according
to a modified version of (26) with a discount factor κt−1i .
Each SU also needs to determine a subset of feasible actions
that do not interfere with higher priority traffic. This is
done through estimating the expected interference based on
the policy estimation model in (27). The local deterministic
best response is calculated based on minimizing the expected
effective transmission time over the candidate links.
Another example of FP can be found in [141], which applies
FP to obtain a defense mechanism against eavesdropping and
jamming attacks in the uplink of a cellular network consisting
of multiple relays (Figure 13). In the defense-attack game,
the normal/malicious nodes are assumed to be able to observe
the actions of other nodes, so they can use the models in
(26) and (27) to estimate the other nodes’ policies. Instead of
directly obtaining a deterministic strategy based on the local
best response, each normal node updates its mixed strategy at
time slot t as follows [71]:
πti(m) = π
t−1
i (m) +
1
t
(I(ati,m)− πt−1i (m)), (28)
in which m is the index of the candidate relays. The malicious
node adopts a similar policy-updating rule based on its own
action set for attacking. The actions of each node at round
t are selected from the best response based on the expected
private utility with the locally estimated policy vector (πti , θti).
The same learning rule as in [141] can be found in [142],
which uses the local policy updating rule in (28) to learn the
strategy in a continuous strategy space for power allocation.
In [142], such a learning scheme is referred to as the best
response dynamics of the power allocation game, and is proved
to be able to converge to the ǫ-equilibria. Such a learning
rule is also adopted in [143], which formulates a hierarchical
network formation game for nodes in a multi-hop wireless
network to select relays. In [143] the relay selection game is
decomposed into multi-layers and solved using a backward
induction method from the sink to the source. The learning
scheme defined by (26)-(28) is applied to each layer-game and
the mixed strategies are obtained from the local best responses.
With the standard FP, local actions are updated based on
the best responses, which are generally of pure strategies.
As pointed out by [33], one drawback of such an FP-based
learning scheme lies in the discontinuity of agent behaviors,
for a small change in the opponent-policy estimation may
result in an abrupt local-behavior change. Due to this, a
Smoothed-FP (SFP) procedure was proposed through search-
Fig. 13. A network consisting of M one-hop relays and N wireless users that
is subject to eavesdropping/jamming from one active malicious node [141].
ing the best response with a modified local objective function
that is perturbed by a differentiable, strictly concave function.
Assume that the best response is obtained through maximizing
a payoff function ui(πi, π−i). Then the operation for obtaining
the smoothed best response BR(·) can be used to replace the
original best response argmaxui(πi, π−i):
BR(π−i) = argmax
pii
{ui(πi, π−i) + νηi(πi)} , (29)
in which the perturbation function ηi is typically given as the
entropy function of πi:
ηi(πi) =
∑
ai∈Ai
−πi(ai) log πi(ai). (30)
Problem (29) with (30) can be explicitly solved as:
BR(π−i) =
exp((1/ν)ui(ai, π−i))∑
a∈Ai
(exp(1/ν)ui(a, π−i))
, (31)
in which ν is the weight of the perturbation term that controls
the strategy exploration rate. It has been proved that for any
average-reward repeated game, we can always find the ν that
makes the payoff of agent n under BR(π−n) to be sufficiently
near the real best-response payoff (Proposition 4.5 of [33]).
The SFP-based learning scheme is also known as the stochastic
FP. Unlike standard FP, in SFP it is not necessary to observe
the opponents’ actions or even know the structure of the local
utility functions. Instead, the expected payoff uti(ai, π−i) in
(31) is estimated based on local information as follows:
u˜ti(ai)=
1
κt−1i
I(ati, ai)
(
uti(ai)−u˜t−1i (ai)
)
+u˜t−1i (ai), (32)
in which κtn and I(atn, an) follow the same definitions as
in (26), and u˜tn(an) is the estimate of the expected utility
uti(ai, π−i). The local mixed policy is usually updated in the
following form:
πti(m) = π
t−1
i (m) + αt
(
BR(u˜ti(ai))− πt−1i
)
, (33)
in which BR(u˜ti(ai)) is calculated based on (31) with the
payoff estimated by (32) and αt is a learning factor.
It is worth noting that with both value iteration in (32) and
policy iteration in (33), SFP is usually considered as a typical
form of CODIPAS-RL methods (see the example in [144]).
Generally, the convergence conditions of SFP are based on the
analysis of Lyapunov stability of the corresponding perturbed
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best response dynamic [76]. A summary of these conditions
for different types of games is given as follows9:
Theorem 3 (Convergence of FP [76]). Consider SFP defined
by (29)-(33) starting from an arbitrary strategy in game G.
(i) If G is a two-player symmetric game with an interior
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) or a two-player zero-
sum game, then SFP converges with probability one to
an NE.
(ii) If G is an N -player potential game, then SFP converges
in a subset of the rest points of the perturbed best
response dynamic. If all the rest points of the perturbed
best response dynamic are hyperbolic and two-order
continuous, SFP converges to an NE with probability one.
(iii) If G is an N -player supermodular game, then SFP
converges almost surely to a rest point of the perturbed
best response dynamic. In particular, if the rest point is
unique, then SFP converges to the NE with probability
one.
With the property of requiring no information exchange,
SFP is considered an important tool in self-organized learning
for resource allocation games. In [145], SFP is applied to
the power control game in wireless ad-hoc networks. Ac-
cording to Theorem 3, SFP is guaranteed to converge to a
stationary point (with a non-zero probability to an NE) for
a supermodular/potential game. In order to take advantage of
such a property, a supermodular utility function is designed
for each node in [145], and the convergence with SFP is
thus guaranteed. However, since the utility function in [145]
is monotonically decreasing, the learning scheme will finally
converge to the unique NE of that game, which corresponds to
all users transmitting with zero power. This problem of utility
function design is addressed in [116] by studying the power
allocation problem in a small-cell network through a non-
trivial Stackelberg game [18]. This game design is intended to
balance the femtocell power efficiency and interference control
in the macrocell. The supermodularity property is retained for
the femto link utility, and the SFP-based scheme give in (31-
33) is applied to the follower game among the femtocells.
The same learning mechanism is adopted in [115], which
considers the power allocation in the femtocells as a common-
payoff game (thus a potential game). With the assumption of
the common-payoff game, it is proved in [115] that the ǫ-
equilibrium is guaranteed to be reached in the potential game
by the SFP-based learning algorithm.
2) Gradient Play: Compared with FP, Gradient Play (GP)
adjusts the strategy of one agent based on the gradient ascent
dynamics instead of directly jumping to the best response
based on the empirical frequencies of the opponent agents’
action selection. Therefore, GP can be viewed as a “better
response” algorithm. Mathematically, following the learning
scheme of the standard GP, each agent in the repeated game
updates its strategy on selecting ai according to [71]:
πt+1i (ai) =
[
qti(ai) + ǫt(∇piiui(πi, θti(a−i)))
]Πi
, (34)
9About the definitions of ESS, rest point and supermodular game, please
refer to [18] for more details.
where ǫt is the time-varying step size, [·]Πi defines the
projection onto the strategy space Πi of agent i, θti(a−i)
is the estimated opponent-action frequency, which can be
derived following (27), and qti(ai) is the estimated local-action
frequency, which can be derived in the same manner as (28):
qt+1i (ai) = q
t
i(ai) +
1
t+ 1
(I(ati, ai)− qti(ai)), (35)
where action ati is generated as random outcomes of the
evolving strategies qti . Following (34) and (35), the strategy of
each agent is a (projected) combination of its own empirical
action frequency and a gradient step based on the estimated
opponents’ action frequency. According to [71], [146], GP in
continuous games is guaranteed to converge within a distance
of order of ǫt of the NE of the game, if the NE is a strict one.
However, GP cannot converge to a completely-mixed NE of
the game (see Lemma 4.1 of [71]). Due to such a limitation
on convergence condition, the basic form GP in (34) is rarely
used directly in the solution to networking problems.
As an improvement to the basic form GP, Derivative-Action
GP (DAGP) is developed in [71]. By introducing parameter
vti(ai) to approximate the first-order derivative of qi, the
updating mechanism of DAGP is defined as follows [146]:
vt+1i (ai) = v
t
i(ai) +
µt
t+ 1
(qti(ai)− vti(ai)), (36)
πt+1i (ai) =
[
qti(ai) + ǫt(∇piiui(πi, θti(a−i)))+
µt(q
t
i(ai)− vti(ai))
]Πi
,
(37)
where qti is updated following (35), [·]Πi , ǫt and θti are obtained
in the same way as in (34), and µt is a large factor satisfying
µt > 0. According to [71], [146], for large µt > 0, if ǫ satisfies
certain conditions (see Theorem 4.2 of [71] and Theorem 3.1
and Theorem 3.3 in [146] for more details), the strategy πti is
asymptotically locally stable and converges to the NE with a
non-zero probability.
GP and DAGP not only require the agents to be able to
track the frequency of both the local actions and the opponent
actions, but also require that the structure of local utility
functions is known to each agent. Compared with FP and SFP,
the most important feature of the GP-based learning algorithms
is that the updating mechanism can be easily extended to the
cases of continuous games. In [147], standard GP is applied
to the continuous, random medium access game, in which
a set of wireless nodes learn to play the random access
strategies pi (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1) after observing the vector of
channel contention signal qi. Instead of directly adapting to
the contention signal qi, each wireless node introduces a price
function Ci(qi) to adjust its local net payoff with the original
utility function Ui(pi) as ui(p) = Ui(pi)−piCi(qi). In [147],
the random access game is proved to have a unique nontrivial
NE (namely, ∇piu(p∗i , p∗−i) = 0 at the NE (p∗i , p∗−i)), and
that the standard GP converges geometrically to the nontrivial
NE if a certain condition is satisfied with the step size ǫt
in (34). The application of standard GP can also be found
in the power control game of a multi-cell CDMA network
with dynamic handoffs between cells [148]. After introducing
a pricing mechanism with the cost function based on the local
power consumption, the game formulation in [148] adopts
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a payoff function that is twice continuously differentiable,
non-decreasing and strictly convex. It is proved in [148] that
standard GP is able to exponentially converge to the smallest
convex set which contains all the possible NE of the power
control game, if the spreading factor of the CDMA system
satisfies certain conditions10.
One typical example of applying the DAGP-based learning
to networking problems can be found in [149], which for-
mulates the interference coordination problem in a multi-link
MIMO system as a noncooperative game. In the game, the
covariance matrix of the signal of each link is considered as
the local strategy and is drawn from a common, continuous
strategy space. The matrix form of (37) is adopted and
guaranteed to converge to a unique NE of the game, if the
covariance matrix of the total interference and noise at the
receiver of each link satisfies a certain condition.
3) Learning Automata: As introduced in Section II-A,
LA is featured by the process of action selection based on
policy iteration using only local information. For non-game-
based wireless networking problems, (distributed) LA has
been shown to be efficient in the scenarios which can be
formulated to be of single state and controlled by a single
active decision-making entity at one time instance. Successful
applications of LA in these scenarios can be found in the
works such as multipath on-demand multicast routing in CRNs
[150] and multicast routing in mobile ad-hoc networks [151].
When it comes to the more complicated framework of network
control games, most of the LA-based learning schemes are
employed to obtain NE policies. As a special case of the
general LA updating rule (11), LR−I learning has been widely
applied to network control problems due to its simplicity and
convergence property. By abusing the notations in (11), the
rules of LR−I learning can be expressed as (38):
πt+1i (ai) =
{
πti(a
t
i) + µr˜
t
i(1− πti(ati)), if ati = ai,
πti(ai)− µr˜tiπti(ai), if ati 6= ai, (38)
where µ (0 < µ < 1) is a learning parameter. The convergence
property to the NE for the learning mechanism in (38) in a
general noncooperative game has been proved in [152]:
Theorem 4. In a repeated game G = 〈N ,A = ×An, {0 ≤
r˜n ≤ 1}n∈N 〉, with each agent employing LR−I learning, the
following statements are true if µ in (38) is sufficiently small:
• all stationary points that are not NE are unstable, and
• all strict NE in pure strategies are asymptotically stable.
However, no uniform expression is provided in the literature
to obtain the normalized environment response function r˜ti in
(38). For example, in [153], standard LR−I learning is adopted
to manage the opportunistic spectrum access by N SUs over
M primary channels with a fixed transmit rate Rm on channel
m. In this case, the normalized random reward r˜ti is obtained
as follows:
r˜tm = u
t
m/(max
n
Rn), (39)
10
“Exponential convergence” is used to describe the property of learning
when asymptotically converging to the convex set. If ‖πti − π∗i ‖ = O(µt)
for some µ < 1, we say that the learning process achieves exponential
convergence.
where utm is the instantaneous reward of SU m after con-
sidering the PU activities and the channel contention with
its rival nodes. The opportunistic spectrum access game is
further modeled as an exact potential game. Therefore, at least
one pure-strategy NE exists for the game [18]. According to
Theorem 4, LR−I learning ensures the convergence to the
pure-strategy NE in the opportunistic spectrum access game.
Apart from [153], the standard LR−I learning scheme can be
found as a frequent solution to the problems whenever the
convergence property of Theorem 4 is satisfied and the exis-
tence of a pure-strategy NE can be proved. The applications of
the standard LR−I learning scheme range from relay-selection
in the cooperative network [154] to the CSMA-based DSA
management [155] and the MIMO-based DSA management
[156] in the CRNs.
In contrast to the aforementioned works, the variation of the
standard LR−I learning mechanism using a different strategy-
updating rule can also be found in the studies such as [157].
In [157], a discrete power control problem in a CDMA-like
cellular network with mutual interference is modeled as a
repeated noncooperative game. In the power control game,
each node only knows its local payoff measured as the power
efficiency. The modified linear-reward-inaction updating rule
in [157] is defined as follows:
πt+1i (ai) =
{
πti(a
t
i)− µr˜tiπti(ati), if ati 6= ai,
πti(ai) + µr˜
t
i
∑
a 6=ai
πti(a), if ati = ai. (40)
Let uti denote the utility of node i by choosing a discrete power
level ati for transmission at time t. Then, the normalized utility
feedback r˜ti is obtained as follows:
r˜ti =
uti −mini{ui}
maxi{ui} −mini{ui} . (41)
The major difference between (40) and (38) lies in the way of
updating the probability of choosing an action when the action
results in a new reward. Under this learning algorithm, the
evolution of the power selection becomes a Markov process.
Following the same approach of proving the convergence prop-
erty based on Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) analysis
and Lyapunov’s stability theorem as in [152], it is proved in
[157] that the LA-based learning scheme in (40) will only
converge to the mixed-strategy NE of the considered power
control game if the learning step µ is sufficiently small.
In addition to LR−I learning, other learning schemes based
on the general LA updating rule in (11) are also employed for
resource allocation in the CRNs. In [158], an LA mechanism
based on the softmax (Logit) function is applied to learn
the ǫ-optimal solution to the traffic allocation problem in a
multi-hop cognitive wireless mesh network. With the proposed
LA mechanism, node i’s local action to select link k for
transmitting at the n-th possible rate is determined by the
softmax function:
πni,k =
exp(wni,k)∑N
m=0 exp(w
m
i,k)
, (42)
where N denotes the number of possible transmit rates and
the intermediate parameter wni,k is updated according to the
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Fig. 14. A toy example of power allocation in the multi-user CRN with
limited ability of acquiring the strategy information from other CRs [159].
following LA rules:
wni,k(t+1)=


wni,k(t) + αtΞ(t)(1 −
exp(wni,k)∑
N
s=0 exp(w
m
i,k
)
)
+
√
αtξ
n
i,k(t), for n = j;
wni,k(t) +
√
αtξ
n
i,k(t), for n 6= j.
(43)
In (43), αt (0 < αt < 1) is the learning rate and ξqi,k(t)
is obtained from a set of i.i.d. random variables with zero
mean. Ξ(t) is the normalized utility feedback that is provided
by the gateway node. In order to ensure the convergence of
the learning algorithm in (43), the traffic engineering game is
modeled as a team game with the identical payoff (hence a
potential game). Thus the SUs need to share the information
on the global, normalized utility feedback Ξ(t) for updating
the value of wqi,k(t). In [158], the value of Ξ(t) is obtained
from arbitrarily scaling the sum of the local payoff functions
down to the range of [0, 1]. By allowing information exchange
and constructing an N -person potential game, it is proved in
[158] that for sufficiently small values of αt and the variance
of ξqi,k(t), the LA mechanism in (43) is guaranteed to achieve
the ǫ-optimal solution to the traffic engineering problem.
In [159], Bush-Mosteller LA [70] is adopted for learning
the NE of the repeated power control game in a CRN with
the set of power constraints on the aggregated interference
experienced by each PU (Figure 14). Bush-Mosteller learning,
also known as the linear reward-penalty LA, can be viewed
as a general form of LR−I learning [160]. In [159], the
CRN is assumed to be composed of N SUs and M PUs.
The wireless channels are assumed to be stationary, and the
SUs are able to monitor each PU’s feedback indicating the
sum of interference to each PU receiver. It is also assumed
that no SU can observe the strategies of the other SUs
(see Figure 14). Let Uk(πk, π−k) be the expected utility of
SU link k and Wl(πk, π−k) be the corresponding expected
interference at PU l, the constrained game is transformed
into an unconstrained game with the help of the Lagrange
multipliers. The Lagrange function of SU k is defined with a
regularization term δ/2
(‖πk‖2 − ‖λk‖) as follows:
Lδk(πk, π−k,λk) =Uk(πk, π−k)−
∑M
l=1 λl(Wl(πk, π−k)
−W l)− δ
2
(‖πk‖2 − ‖λk‖2) , (44)
where λl is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint from
PU l, λk is the vector of λl and W l is the maximum level
of the interference to PU l. It is shown in [159] that finding
the equilibrium point of the original constrained power control
game is asymptotically equivalent to determining the equilib-
rium point of the unconstrained game with the regularized
function given in (44). The following learning scheme, based
on linear reward-penalty LA, is adopted to update the local
policies:
πt+1k =π
t
k+α
t
k[eNk(P
t
k)−πtk+
r˜tk(e
Nk−NkeNk(P tk))
Nk − 1 ], (45)
where P tk is the power level that SU k chooses at iteration t.
eNk(P
t
k) and eNk are defined as follows:
eNk(P
t
k) = (0, . . . , 0, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ik
, 0, . . . , 0)T , (46)
e
Nk = (1, . . . , 1)T . (47)
The normalized utility feedback r˜tk is obtained based on the
Lagrangian with the expected utility and interference being
replaced by the instantaneous payoff and interference in (44).
With a user-defined normalization procedure, the value of
r˜tk is scaled within the interval [0, 1]11. The time-varying
correction (adaptation) factors αtk also belong to the unit
segment. Meanwhile, the Lagrange multiplier is updated as:
λt+1l = [λ
t
l − αtλψtl ]
λ
+
l+1
0 , (48)
ψtl = δ
tλtl − ηtl + Cl, (49)
where ηl is the instantaneous sum of interference at PU l
and δt is the regularization factor in (44), and [·]λ
+
l+1
0 is a
projection operator. The learning scheme defined by (45)-(49)
ensures the convergence to the NE, provided that the sequences
{ηtl} and {δt} satisfy certain properties (see Assumptions
A1-A3 in [159]), and the power control game is diagonal
concave [70]. Compared with LR−I learning, Bush-Mosteller
LA requires stricter condition for converging to the NE.
This is a major reason for impeding Bush-Mosteller learning
from being widely applied to the wireless resource allocation
problems. Due to the requirement for the game to be diagonal
concave, and because the original SINR-based utility does
not naturally possess the property of diagonal concavity, the
authors of [159] use an arbitrarily designed utility function
to replace the real expected mutual-interference-based local
utility in order to derive the proper payoff function for the
constructed power control game.
4) No-Regret Learning: Usually, the terminology “no-
regret learning” is used to refer to any learning algorithm that
exhibits the property of no-regret when compared with the
set of some designated strategies [72], [161]. Formally, for an
infinitely repeated game G = 〈N ,A=×An, {un}n∈N 〉, and
given the adversary (deterministic) strategy a−i, the regret of
agent i for playing strategy πi instead of choosing strategy ai
can be defined as the difference in its payoff obtained from
playing these strategies:
Ri(πi, ai|a−i) = ui(ai, a−i)− ui(πi, a−i). (50)
11For the detailed derivation of r˜t
k
, please refer to (31) and (32) in [70].
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Let φ(·) denote a modification mapping π′i = φ(πi), where
π′i(a) =
∑
b:φ(b)=a πi(b) (a, b ∈ Ai). Then, for a sequence of
adversary strategies {at−i}, we can define a general no-regret
learning algorithm (also known as φ-no-regret learning) for
agent i as follows [161]:
Definition 6 (φ-no-regret learning). For a finite subset Φ of
memoryless mapping φ, a learning algorithm that generates
πti is said to exhibit φ-no-regret if the regret of that learning
algorithm,
Ri,φ(π
t
i , φ(π
t
i)|at−i) = ui(φ(πti ), at−i)− ui(πti , at−i), (51)
satisfies the following condition:
Di = lim
T→0
sup
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ri,φ(π
t
i , φ(π
t
i)|at−i) = 0. (52)
There are two well-studied categories of the φ-no-regret
properties: no-external-regret and no-internal-regret [161]. The
no-external-regret property is to minimize the regret with
respect to any comparison class of algorithms that lead to
deterministic strategies. In other words, for no-external-regret
learning, the mapping φ(·) satisfies φ(πi) = a (a ∈ Ai). The
no-internal-regret property is also known as no-swap-regret
since the property of internal regret swaps the current online
strategies as follows:
φa,b(πi(c)) =


πi(c), if c 6= a, b,
0, if c = a,
πi(a) + πi(b), if c = b.
(53)
One well-known example for applying no-external-regret
learning to the wireless networking problems is [162], which
uses the random weighted majority (i.e., Hedge) algorithm
[163] for learning the NE strategies in a channel allocation
game in a CRN. With a careful utility design, the channel-
allocation game is proved to be an exact potential game. Let
uti(ai) denote the cumulated instantaneous payoff received by
SU i given the sequence of the adversary strategy {at−i}, the
mixed policy of SU i is updated as follows:
πt+1i (ai) =
(1 + µ)u
t
i(ai)∑
a′
i
∈Ai
(1 + µ)u
t
i
(a′
i
)
, (54)
where µ > 0. It is well-known that the learning scheme in
(54) has a regret bound as DTi ≤ µ/2 [78]. Compared with
the widely applied best-response-based learning schemes for
potential games, which also ensure the convergence to the NE,
the random weighted majority algorithm (54) does not need
any information sharing between SUs.
The construction of a no-external-regret learning mechanism
can be further illustrated by the example of [164], where the
problem of collaborative sensing with malicious nodes in an
N -channel CRN is studied. In the considered CRN, SU j is
supposed to collaborate with a set of its neighbor SUs Nj and
to choose whether to aggregate one of their sensing reports
into its local channel-state prediction. At time t, a mixed policy
πjt = [π
j
1,t, . . . , π
j
|Nj |,t
] is adopted to choose the reports from
the SUs in Nj . With the goal of minimizing the long-term
expected loss due to false decision by choosing the sequence
πt instead of the pure-strategy best response (internal regret),
we have
min
{pijt}
T
t=1
T∑
t=1
(
l
j
(πjt , s
t)− lj(j′, st)
)
, ∀j′ ∈ Nj , (55)
where lj(j′, st) is the instantaneous loss due to adopting the
report by SU j′, and lj(πjt , st) is the average loss with policy
πjt at channel state st: l
j
(πjt , s
t) =
∑
j′∈Nj∪{j}
πjj′,tl
j(j′, st).
In [164], such a decision process is modeled as a two-player
constant-sum game. In the game, SU j plays against nature12,
which plays as an adversary player and chooses state s aiming
at causing the worst cost to SU j. The strategy-updating
mechanism is designed upon the softmax function (42) with
the accumulated instantaneous loss
∑t
τ=1 l
j(j′
τ
, sτ ) being the
argument of the logarithmic function exp(·). It is shown in
[164] that no-regret learning based on the softmax function
converges to the NE, which is equivalent to the minimax value
of the game.
Another category of no-regret learning algorithms that are
widely applied in the context of network control aims at
minimizing the internal regret and learning the CE in repeated
games [72]. For a general repeated game G = 〈N ,A =
×An, {un}n∈N 〉, the estimated average loss for agent i to
play action ati instead of playing a′i at time t is given by:
Dti(a
t
i, a
′
i) =
1
t
∑
τ≤t
(
uti(a
′
i, a
t
−i)− uti(ati, at−i)
)
. (56)
Based on (56), the regret of agent i for not playing a′i is
Rti(a
t
i, a
′
i) = max
{
Dti(a
t
i, a
′
i), 0
}
. (57)
With (57), the mixed policy of agent i is updated by
πt+1i (a) =


1
µ
Rti(a
t
i, a), ∀a 6= ati,
1−
∑
a′ 6=at
i
πt+1i (a
′), a = ati,
(58)
where µ is a sufficiently large constant to ensure that πi (i ∈
N ) is a well-defined probability.
Like the random weighted majority algorithm, the learning
scheme defined by (56)-(58) to learn the CE does not need
the agents to exchange the action/utility information. The no-
internal-regret learning scheme ensures the asymptotic conver-
gence to the set of the CE, according to Theorem 5 [72]:
Theorem 5. If every agent plays according to the learning
scheme defined by (56)-(58), the empirical distribution of the
joint action selection:
zT (a) =
1
T
|t ≤ T : at = a| (59)
converges almost surely to the set of CE of the game G as
T →∞.
The applications of the learning scheme given by (56)-(58)
to network control problems can be found in [165]–[168].
As one of the earliest works that employ no-regret learning
in the network control problem, it is aimed at obtaining the
12The definition of nature in an extensive form game can be found in [18].
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CE in a dynamic spectrum access game with an overlay CR
network in [165]. No-regret learning is used for the SUs
to address the problem of channel contention. It is shown
that the performance at the CE obtained through learning is
almost as good as the optimal equilibrium in the set of CE. In
[166], a joint power-channel selection problem is studied in
an underlay CRN with a free band and a set of price-charging
PU channels. The no-regret learning algorithm (56)-(58) is
aggregated with an auction game, which considers the SINR
to the PU or the allocation power as an item for auction. The
joint power-channel selection game is played in two levels.
In the lower-level subgame, the SUs perform the SINR/power
bidding game with a fixed set of PU-channel selection. In the
higher-level subgame, the SUs adopt the no-regret learning
algorithm (56)-(58) to obtain the CE in the channel-selection
game. In [167], the learning scheme of (56)-(58) is adopted to
obtain the CE strategies in a spectrum sensing game among
heterogeneous SUs in an overlay CRN. In the game, each
SU chooses either to cooperatively sense the PU channel that
it is assigned to with some power consumption (i.e., with
some cost), or to directly access the channel as a free rider
(i.e., without any cost) based on the sensing reports by the
neighbor SUs. With the proposed no-regret learning scheme,
the strategies are obtained based on minimizing the total regret
of the neighborhood set of an SU rather than the individual
regret. It is shown in [167] that the learning scheme with the
neighborhood regret can significantly outperform the learning
algorithm based on the local regret. This is also considered
as the main reason that motivates local SUs to share their
local action and payoff information for neighborhood learning.
In [168], the scheme in (56)-(58) is applied to learn the CE
of the subcarrier allocation strategies in a multi-cell OFDMA
network. Again, each link in the subcarrier allocation game
does not need to know the private strategies and utilities of
the other links.
The no-internal-regret learning scheme (56)-(58) only re-
quires that the structure of the local payoff function is known
to each agent. Compared with the NE-driven learning meth-
ods such as FP and best-response learning, no-internal-regret
learning could achieve a better social performance (i.e., in
terms of sum of the players’ rewards). Since the set of CE
is a convex polytope with all the NE lying on one of its
sections [169], it is possible for the no-internal-regret learning
algorithm to reach a CE that is not in the polygon of the NE,
thus resulting in a better performance than any NE. Although
the learning rule of (56)-(58) does not guarantee convergence
to the social optimal CE, a number of empirical studies (e.g.,
no-regret learning in the cognitive congestion control games
[170], [171]) show that the no-regret learning scheme can
significantly outperform best-response learning and FP [170].
Moreover, its convergent strategy can be considered as a good
approximation of the global optimal solution [171]. As a result,
many studies consider the no-internal-regret learning scheme
as an approach to implicitly enforce cooperation within the
framework of general-sum noncooperative games.
B. Applications of Learning in the Context of Stochastic
Games (SGs)
SGs generalizes both the repeated games and the MDPs
by allowing the payoff of the players at each round of the
game to be dependent on the state variable, whose evolution
is influenced by the joint actions of the players. Compared
with the models based on repeated games, SGs are considered
a more practical tool for modeling the agent interaction in a
stochastic wireless environment, especially when the elements
of the wireless environment (e.g., channel states, buffer states
and collision states) evolve stochastically and are influenced
by the transmission strategies of the wireless agents. In the
context of SGs, the model-free learning schemes are referred
to the value/policy-iteration algorithms (e.g., the algorithms
summarized in [172]) that do not require any a-priori knowl-
edge about the state transition of the wireless system. We
note that such a property makes model-free learning especially
appropriate for finding the solution to the equilibria of the
SGs in the context of wireless networks. This is because in
most of the practical scenarios it is difficult to obtain all
the details of the system dynamics due to the complexity
of the network. In what follows, we organize our survey
on learning in SGs according to the approaches used for
experience updating (i.e., value-iteration-based learning vs.
non-value-iteration-based learning).
1) Value-Iteration-Based Learning: In contrast to those
model-based solutions which use linear programming to obtain
the NE (see the example of a constrained power control
SG [173]), value-iteration-based learning algorithms generally
need to construct a series of intermediate “matrix games”
from the original SGs. Consider a general discounted-reward
SG, G = 〈N ,S,A, {un}n∈N ,Pr(s′|s, a)〉, a matrix game is
defined based on the current estimation of the state value of
the SG, which is derived in a similar way as (4):
Definition 7 (Matrix game [67]). An n-player matrix game
(also known as stage game) in an SG is defined as a tuple
G(s) = 〈N ,A1, . . . ,A|N |, Qˆtβ,1, . . . , Qˆtβ,|N |〉, in which Qˆtβ,i
(1 ≤ i ≤ |N |) is given by:
Qˆtβ,i(s, a)=u(s, a)+β
∑
s
′∈S
Pr(s′|s, π)V piβ,i(s′|s, πi, π−i). (60)
We note that in (60), V piβ,i(s′|s, πi, π−i) = Epi{Qˆtβ,i(s, a)}.
Under policy π, transition probability Pr(s′|s, π) can be ex-
pressed as follows:
Pr(s′|s, π)=
∑
a1∈A1
. . .
∑
a|N|∈A|N|
(
Pr(s′|s, a1, . . . , a|N |)
×π1(s, a1) · · ·π|N |(s, a|N |)
)
.
(61)
According to Definition 7, a general form of strategy searching
based on value iteration can be implemented as in Algorithm
1 [172]. In (62) of Algorithm 1, operator Evalpi(·) computes
(estimates) the expected payoff in the NE of the matrix game.
The equivalence between the NE of the matrix game and the
NE of the discounted SG is given by Theorem 6.
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Algorithm 1 Value-iteration-based learning algorithm.
Require: Initialize V tβ,i, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |N | arbitrarily.
while convergence criterion is not met do
(a) For state s at round t, update the estimated value of
Qˆti(s, a) of the matrix game.
(b) For state s, update the expected state value of
V tβ,i(s) after computing the (mixed) equilibrium strategy
(πi(s), π−i(s)):
V tβ,i(st)← Evalpi(Qˆβ,i(s, a)). (62)
end while
Theorem 6 ([67]). The following are equivalent:
• π∗ is an equilibrium point in the discounted SG, G, with
equilibrium payoffs (Vβ,1(π∗), . . . , Vβ,|N |(π∗)).
• For each s ∈ S, strategy π∗(s) constitutes an equilibrium
point in static matrix game G(s) with equilibrium pay-
offs (Evalpi∗(Qˆβ,1(s, a)), . . . ,Evalpi∗(Qˆβ,|N |(s, a))). The
value of Qˆβ,i(s, a) is given by Definition 7.
According to Theorem 6, Algorithm 1 can be considered
a combination of a matrix-game solver and a value-iteration-
based state value learner. It works as the general form of a
set of model-free strategy-learning algorithms, which differ
from each other only in the way of defining operator Evalpi(·).
In [64], operator Evalpi(·) in value iteration is implemented
by a minimax optimization process, and the Q-value of each
learning agent is updated through a standard single-agent
Q-learning process. Such a learning scheme is known as
minimax-Q learning. Specifically, the learning mechanism can
be expressed by
Qt+1β,i (st, a
t
i, a
t
−i)← (1− αt)Qtβ,i(st, ati, at−i)+
αt
(
ui(st, a
t
i, a
t
−i) + βV
t
β,i(st+1)
)
,
(63)
V tβ,i(st) = max
pi(st,ai)
min
a−i
∑
a∈A
Qtβ,i(st, ai, a−i)π(st, ai), (64)
πt(s, ai) = arg max
pi(s,ai)
min
a−i
∑
ai
Qtβ,i(s, ai, a−i)π(s, ai). (65)
The solution to (65) is usually obtained through linear
programming, which requires that the matrix game of the
SG is of complete information. It is worth noting that (64)
is an approximation of the exact state value, V tβ,i(st) =
maxpi(st,ai)minpi(st,a−i)
∑
a∈AQ
t
β,i(st, a)π(st, a), which
cannot be obtained directly since the local strategies are
usually private information. Due to the approximation, the
updating mechanism in (63)-(65), although proved to be
effective by empirical studies [64], does not provide a strict
condition for convergence to the NE.
Minimax-Q learning is usually adopted to solve the prob-
lems which can be described as a constant-sum (also known
as strictly competitive) game. One typical category of its
applications in wireless networks is strategy-learning in attack-
defense problems, since such problems can usually be modeled
as a two-player, zero-sum game with the group of normal
nodes and the group of malicious nodes treated as two super
players. In [174], a two-player zero-sum SG is adopted to
model the anti-jamming process of a group of SUs in the
Fig. 15. A snapshot of the anti-jamming defense process in a multi-channel
CRN (adapted from [174]).
CRN (Figure 15). Due to the random activities of the PUs, the
channel-availability states viewed by the SUs are modeled as
a group of independent, two-state Markov chains. In addition,
for each channel, the channel quality measured by the local
SNR is modeled as a finite state Markov chain. In [174],
the devices in the CRN are divided into two groups: the
normal SUs and jamming nodes. Both the normal SUs and
the attackers access the PU channels in a slotted manner. At
each time slot, the normal SUs will select a subset of channels
for transmission while the attackers will select a subset of
channels for jamming. The group of channels that are selected
for transmission are further subdivided into control channels
and data channels. For a normal SU, the non-zero gain of a
channel can only be achieved when the channel is used for
data transmission and at least one control channel selected
by the normal SU is not jammed by the attackers. The goal
of the normal SUs is to maximize the local channel utility.
Based on the formulation of the two-player zero-sum SG,
the standard minimax-Q-learning algorithm is applied for the
normal SUs to find the equilibrium strategies in the stochastic
attack-defense game. Convergence of the learning algorithm
has been shown by empirical studies. Also, the numerical
simulations show that minimax-Q learning outperforms both
the myopic strategy, which does not consider the future payoff,
and the fixed strategy, which uniformly selects the channels
regardless of the attacker’s strategy.
The application of minimax-Q learning in a similar scenario
can be found in [175], which formulates the competition
for open access spectrum in a tactical wireless network as
a competitive mobile network game. The study in [175]
extends the attack-defense model in [174] by dividing the
competitive mobile network into two sub-networks: the ally
network and the enemy network. Each network is composed
of both communicating nodes and jamming nodes. The goal
of the two networks is to achieve the maximum spectrum
utility while jamming the opponent transmission as much as
possible. The channel-availability state is jointly determined
by the transmission-jamming actions of the two networks as a
controlled Markov chain. Channel access in the competitive
network is modeled as a two-player, zero-sum game, and
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standard minimax-Q learning is adopted for both the ally and
the enemy network to learn their equilibrium strategies. Apart
from [175], other applications of minimax-Q learning can be
found in [176], [177], which basically adopt the same frame-
work of the two-player, zero-sum SG as in [174], [175] to
obtain the anti-jamming scheme. In [176], minimax-Q learning
in the SG is employed in a typical DSA network without
considering the impact of jamming the control channels. In
[177], the two-player SG model is extended to the scenarios of
stochastic routing in a MANET, and the attack-proof strategy
is obtained through minimax-Q learning.
For networking problems that need to be described as an n-
player general-sum SG, a more general learning scheme can be
implemented by replacing the minimax operator for Evalpi(·)
with the operator that leads to the payoff of the NE in the
general game. For the discounted-reward general-sum SGs,
such a learning scheme is known as Nash Q-learning [66].
Nash Q-learning adopts the same Q-value updating scheme
(63) as in the minimax-Q learning algorithm, and requires that
the value of V tβ,i(st) is obtained based on the matrix game NE
of the SG. According to Theorem 6, as long as the NE of each
matrix game obtained from the SG in stage st is used in (63) to
compute the value of V tβ,i(st), the learning process converges
to the NE of the SG. For Nash Q-learning, operator Evalpi(·)
can be expressed by:
V tβ,i(st) =
∑
a1∈A1
. . .
∑
a|N|∈A|N|
|N |∏
i=1
π∗i (st, ai)Q
t
β,i(st, a). (66)
In (66), π∗i (s) is the NE strategy of the matrix game at stage
t when the payoff matrix of agent i is Qtβ,i(s, a).
Theorem 6 also holds when the SG is based on average
reward. The counterpart to Nash Q-learning in an average-
reward SG is known as Nash R-learning [67]. Nash R-learning
adopts the R-learning-based scheme for state-action updating
as in (8) and (9), which can be summarized by the following
equations:
Rt+1i (st, at)←Rti(st, at)+
αt
(
ui(st, at)+V
t
i (st+1)−Rti(st, at)−hti(st, at)
)
,
(67)
ht+1i (st, at) = h
t
i(st, at) + θtV
t
i (st+1), (68)
where V ti (s) is the equilibrium payoff of the stage game and
is computed following (66).
When the goal of the learning process is to find the CE
of the discounted-reward SG instead of the NE, Correlated-Q
(CE-Q) Learning can be implemented based on the updating
mechanism in (63)-(65) with the state value V tβ,i(st) estimated
at the CE strategies [68]. The equivalence between the CE of
the original SG and the CE of the matrix game in each state
still holds. Based on Definition 3 and Theorem 6, we have
Theorem 7 (CE in the SG [68]). For a discounted-reward
SG G, a stationary policy π is a correlated equilibrium if
∀i ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A with πi(ai) > 0, for all a′i ∈ Ai(s)∑
a−i∈A−i
π(s, a−i|ai)Qβ,i(s, (a−i, ai)) ≥∑
a−i∈A−i
π(s, a−i|ai)Qβ,i(s, (a−i, a′i)), (69)
which defines the CE of the matrix game in s as π(s).
For both the NE based Q-learning (Nash-Q and Nash-R) and
the CE-based Q-learning (CE-Q), it is not specified how the
equilibrium strategies π∗i (s) for each matrix game is obtained
during the learning process. Since it is necessary for the game
to be of complete information in order to immediately obtain
the NE/CE of the matrix game, it is required that the learning
agents should keep track of the entire Q-table from all the
other agents at state s in order to compute the exact stage-
game equilibrium. In practice, exchanging such information
will result in a large transmission overhead, which is usually
unaffordable in a wireless network. As a result, most of the
existing studies apply heuristic methods to approximate the
matrix game equilibrium. One example of payoff approxima-
tion at the NE of the matrix game can be found in [178],
which decouples the wireless network into a group of Service
Providers (SPs) and a single entity called Network Operators
(NOs) for network virtualization. Each SP is responsible for
reallocating the available spectrum resources to a group of
end users, while the NO is responsible for allocating the
time-varying spectrum resources to the SPs. Here, resource
allocation through the interface between the NO and the SPs
at each time slot is treated as an auction game with the NO
acting as the auctioneer and the SPs acting as the bidders.
The auction is performed following the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism [18]. The entire auction process in the
stochastic environment is modeled as a discounted general-
sum SG, in which the channel state and the traffic state are
assumed to be Markovian and the SP action is the selection of
value functions through choosing the transmit rate. In [178],
the matrix games of the original SG is referred to as the
“current games”. Also, to avoid directly computing the value
of Vβ,i(s) in (66), a conjecture price which approximates the
unit-rate price (strategy) of the NO in the future is introduced.
A Q-value updating scheme which is analogous to the SAS-
based Q-learning scheme is proposed, and the value of the
conjecture price is updated using the subgradient method.
For networking problems which do not possess the single-
server-distributed-agents property as stochastic auction games,
the equilibrium strategies can be learned by implementing an
appropriate amount of local information exchange. In [179],
the problem of traffic offloading in a stochastic heterogeneous
cellular network is first formulated as a centralized discrete-
time MDP and then as an SG. In the SG, a group of macrocell
BSs try to offload their downlink traffic to their corresponding
group of small-cell BSs, which operate in the open access
mode and share the same band with the macro BSs. Before
the learning mechanism is implemented, the authors in [179]
employ a standard state abstraction procedure based on linear
state-value combination (see our discussion in Section III-A).
The Q-values (i.e., the payoff of matrix games) are updated
with the gradient-ascending method based on the gradient of
the new Q-values after state abstraction. The matrix game in
a given state s is modeled as a “virtual game” with common
payoff by allowing the macro BSs to share their instantaneous
spectrum utility with each other. Also, the action of each BS
is updated using ǫ-exploration instead of directly computing
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the mixed strategy of the matrix game. It is proved in [179]
that convergence (which may not be the NE) is guaranteed
with probability one.
A different approach to approximate the matrix game equi-
librium with only local information in the SG can be found
in [180], [181], which employ the learning methods for the
repeated games to learn the matrix game equilibrium strategies
and then use these intermediate strategies to approximate
the state value V pi∗β,i (s) of the original SG. In [180], the
interference mitigation problem with a finite action set of
discrete powers for both the PUs and the SUs in a CRN is
modeled as a discounted-reward SG. In [181], the cross-layer
resource allocation problem for layered video transmission
in a CRN is modeled as a discounted-reward SG. In both
works, the goal of strategy learning is to find the CE of their
respective SG. Both works treat the matrix game at state s ∈ S
as a repeated game and adopt the no-internal-regret learning
method defined by(56)-(58) to approximate the CE strategy
π∗i (s) at state s. Let π˜i(s) define the intermediate strategy
that is obtained with (58). Since with the no-internal-regret
learning scheme, no action/payoff information exchange is
needed, the strategy estimation in the SG is solely based on
local information. The same method as in (63) is adopted for
Q-value updating, for which state value V pi∗β,i (s) under the CE
strategy can be estimated as the expected payoff of the matrix
game:
V tβ,i(st) =
∑
ai∈Ai
π˜t(st, a)Q
t
β,i(st, a). (70)
To further reduce the information-exchange overhead, the
values of π˜t(st, a) and Qtβ,i(st, a) can be replaced by the
conditional local strategy (given the adversary actions) and the
Q-table based on the local state-action pairs [181], repectively.
Such a two-fold, approximate learning scheme does not require
the information exchange between wireless devices. However,
compared with the original learning scheme in Algorithm 1,
such a learning algorithm may suffer from using the non-
CE policies in the matrix game and from the inaccurate
estimation of V tβ,i(st). Although empirical studies show that
convergence can be achieved by the two-fold learning scheme,
no theoretical support is available to guarantee the convergence
to the CE.
2) Conjecture-Based Learning: Consider the problem of
unguaranteed convergence due to the inaccurate estimation of
the equilibrium strategies in the matrix games with two-fold
learning, the concept of “conjecture” [37] about one player’s
opponent policies is introduced in several recent studies [182]–
[184]. In an SG, the conjecture of agent i can be defined as
any belief function ci : S ×Ai → C, in which C is the space
of agent i’s conjectures (e.g., about the opponents’ policies
and states). In the case of policy conjecture, we can define
cti(s, a−i) as the conjecture of opponent policy π−i(s) by
agent i at time t. With only local information, the most widely
accepted conjecture updating mechanism is
ct+1i (s, a−i) = c
t
i(s, a−i) + ω
s
i (π(s, ai)− πti(s, ai)), (71)
where πti(s, ai) is the so-called reference point and is assumed
to be of common knowledge to all the players. With (71), the
Fig. 16. Structure of underlay CR mesh network (adapted from [183]).
conjecture is used by local agent i to maximize its individual
payoff in the condition of not knowing what the strategies of
the other players are, or what their payoff functions are. (71)
is obtained based upon the assumption that the other players
will be able to observe player i’s deviation from the reference
point πti(s, ai), and in response to such a deviation, they will
deviate from their own reference point by a quantity that is
proportional to this deviation [37]. With conjecture ci(s, a−i),
the conjecture equilibrium can be defined as follows (extended
from the definition in [182]):
Definition 8 (Conjecture equilibrium). In the stochastic game
G, a configuration of conjectures c and a joint policy π∗
constitute a conjecture equilibrium if ∀i ∈ N
c∗i (s, π
∗
i ) = ci(s, π
∗), (72)
π∗i = argmax
pii
Qi(s, πi, c
∗
i (s, πi)). (73)
We take [183] as an example to explain the details of
employing conjecture to learn in SGs. In [183], the power allo-
cation problem in an underlay CR mesh network (Figure 16) is
studied. The multi-node power allocation process is modeled
as an SG, in which the local binary state of a secondary link
is determined by the SINR level of its receiver. The local
payoff is measured by the power efficiency. Compared with
the standard matrix-game-based strategy-learning mechanism
in (62)-(63), the authors in [183] constructs the Q-table with
only local states and actions. Here, the policy conjecture is
introduced to approximately learn the matrix game equilibrium
strategy and the Q-value of the SG. Based on the conjecture-
updating scheme in (71), the Q-value updating mechanism is
defined as follows:
Qt+1β,i (si, ai) = (1 − αt)Qtβ,i(si, ai)+
αt
( ∑
a−i∈A−i
cti(si, a−i)ui(si, ai, a−i)+β max
bi∈Ai
Qtβ,i(s
′
i, bi)
)
.
(74)
The local policy πi is updated using the Logit function (42).
It is proved in [183] that the second term on the right-hand
side of (74) is a contraction mapping operator and the learning
scheme converges with sufficiently large number of iterations.
3) Other Learning Algorithms in SGs: For algorithms that
do not work in the framework of hierarchical learning that is
separated into learning in the matrix games and the original
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Algorithm 2 Two-layer learning mechanism in the SG.
Require: Initialize V tβ,i and πti , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |N |.
while convergence criterion is not met do
Outer loop: V t+1β,i ← UpdateStateValue(uti, V tβ,i, πti , πt−i)
Inner loop: πt+1i ← UpdateStrategy(V tβ,i, πti , πt−i).
end while
SG, we simply refer them to the category of the “other learning
algorithms”. In these algorithms, the Q-learning-based value-
iteration scheme for the payoff of the matrix game may not
necessarily be applied, or the computation of the state value of
the SG may not be needed. Due to the complexity of a general
SG, most of the existing learning methods in this category
cannot be represented by a single prototypical algorithm.
We note that for an SG, the property of the MDP generally
requires that the state value of the game be computed following
the Bellman optimality equation (in the general form as (3)),
whenever a stationary policy is to be obtained. Extending from
the value-iteration-based algorithm, we can construct a general
learning scheme, which is composed of two learning loops: an
inner loop that uses an appropriate scheme to approximate the
SG equilibrium strategies π∗ and an outer loop that employs
an appropriate method to estimate the state value Vβ,i(s) of
each player. Within this general framework, the construction of
matrix games is not necessary. We can generalize the two-layer
learning process in SG G = 〈N ,S,A, {un}n∈N ,Pr(s′|s, a)〉
as Algorithm 2.
One widely-used two-layer approach for strategy learning
in wireless SGs is to adopt FP-based policy updating as
the inner-loop learning scheme. Such an approach of policy
evolution can be found rooted in the model-based learning
algorithms (namely, with known state-transition maps) [185].
Since the standard FP-based algorithm with (26) and (27)
requires that each wireless node to track the opponent actions,
extending FP-based learning from repeated games to the SG
is considered a challenge due to the explosion of state-action
dimensionality. In [186], such a challenge is resolved by
regulating the SG into a sequential game, in which only one
wireless node is allowed to update its action in each round.
In [186], the problem of joint channel selection and power
allocation for the SUs in an overlay DSA network is studied.
With the assumption of a sequential game, each SU adopts a
standard SAS-based Q-learning scheme as in (7) for updating
the Q-table based on the local state-action pairs. To further
reduce the state-action space, Q-learning is only applied to the
strategy-learning for channel selection. The power adaptation
is performed only after the channels are selected by the SUs.
The FP-based mixed-strategy-updating scheme in [186] can be
considered as a variation of the best-response-based strategy
learning schemes described in (28).
It is also necessary to consider a different approach to
update the state value for FP-based learning when the players
in the SGs update their strategies simultaneously, because the
state value of the MDP cannot be easily estimated by only
tracking the opponents’ actions. For those works that directly
estimate the state value without using the TD-learning-based
methods, it is also necessary to track the frequency of state
transition in order to estimate the state transition probabilities.
Examples of learning the state transition can be found in [87],
[88]. In [87], secondary wireless stations compete with each
other for network resources to transmit delay-sensitive in a
stochastic CRN. In [88], a similar problem is specified in an
overlay CRN with SUs competing for the vacant primary chan-
nels and determining transmitting parameters in a cross-layer
manner. In both works, with the resource allocation problem
in the CRN being modeled as SGs, it is required that the state
transition frequencies of the opponents’ local states are tracked
by each SU. In order to reduce the information exchange
overhead about local state transitions, an SU abstracts the state
space by classifying the opponent SUs’ state space purely
based on its local observation. Instead of learning the real
state-transition frequencies, the transitions of the abstracted
state are recorded. The state value of the SG is updated based
on the reduced states using the standard Bellman optimality
equation (3).
The special structure of some SGs can also be exploited
to simplify the learning process for the FP-based learning
mechanism. One example of such exploitation can be found in
[187], which models the distributed dynamic routing in multi-
hop CRNs as an SG (Figure 17). Since the states of the routing
SG in [187] are defined as the state of channel availability in
the CRN, the SG is featured by the state transitions which only
depend on the PU activities. The SUs in the network attempt
to find the route for minimizing the packet-forwarding delay
due to queueing and channel collision while keeping their
interference to the PUs as small as possible. Since the delay
over a path is equal to the accumulated delay caused by each
link in the path, and the state transition is independent of the
SU’s actions, the original SG in [187] can be decomposed into
a group of layered, stochastic subgames. Each subgame cor-
responds to a hierarchy level13 in the routing path (see Figure
17). The structure (i.e., the payoff matrix) of each subgame
can only be determined when the cost (measured in delay)
of the next-layer game is determined. A backward induction
method is adopted in [187] to compute the equilibrium payoff
in the layered routing game. The computation starts from the
subgame of the layer which ends at the sink SU to the subgame
of the layer which begins from the source SU. Since the state
transition is independent of the SU’s actions, the stochastic
subgame in each layer can be reduced to a group of repeated
games with fixed states. Therefore, the learning of state value
becomes unnecessary and FP-based learning guarantees the
convergence to the global NE, as long as the routing costs at
the equilibrium point of each subgame are properly propagated
to their lower layers.
In addition to learning algorithms that follow Algorithm 2, a
number of miscellaneous learning mechanisms are applied to
SG-based problems in wireless networks. In order to reduce
the requirement of information exchange or to achieve con-
vergence, most of these learning mechanisms exploit special
properties from the SG. As we have discussed in Section IV-A,
13According to [187], the hierarchy levels of the CRN are calculated along
the “media axis”, which is composed of a set of points. At these points, the
lowest detection probability density of the PU’s activities is (approximately)
achieved.
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Fig. 17. A snapshot of a hierarchical multi-hop CRN under the PU
interference footprint (adapted from [187]).
for the Aloha-like spectrum access problem in CRNs [126], the
near-NE policies of the stochastic access game can be obtained
if all the SUs update their local policies with the Logit function
(42), and the Q-value at state s is updated following (23).
In this specific scenario, the two-layer learning mechanism
based on Q-value updating ensures the convergence to near-NE
strategies of the SG without the need of any information ex-
change. In [188], [189], the structural property of a constrained
SG is explored. Specifically, consider a utility-minimizing SG
G = 〈N ,S,×Ai, {ci}i∈N , {di}i∈N ,Pr(s′|s, a)〉 with ci as
the instantaneous local cost in the objective and di as the
instantaneous local cost in the constraint. If the following
assumptions are satisfied with G:
A1) the set of policies that satisfy the constraint of the SG is
non-empty,
A2) the two cost functions ci and di are multi-modular func-
tions with respect to the actions and the state elements
whose transition is a function of the joint local actions,
A3) the transition probability Pr(s′|s, a) is submodular with
respect to the actions and the state elements whose
transition is a function of the joint local actions,
then G has the following property in the structure of the NE:
Theorem 8. Assume A1-A3 hold, then the NE policy of each
player i, π∗i , is a randomized mixture of two pure policies:
π1i and π2i . Each pure policy is nondecreasing on the state
elements whose transition is determined by the joint actions.
Based on Theorem 8, the search for NE policies π∗i can be
reduced to finding a randomized mixture of discrete actions in
the finite action set. A policy-iteration-based strategy-learning
algorithm can be developed based on the Simultaneous Pertur-
bation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) algorithm [190]. In
[188], the rate adaptation problem in a TDMA-based CRN is
modeled as an SG with a latency constraint. In [189], the prob-
lem of joint source-channel rate adaptation in order to transmit
layered video in a multi-user wireless local-area network is
also formulated as an SG with the latency constraint. In both
works, by showing that the assumptions A1-A3 hold in their
respective SG-based model, the SPSA algorithm is applied for
policy-learning. With the SPSA algorithm, no explicit state
value learning is needed, and the local policies are updated
with a gradient-based method with random policy perturbation.
Given that the assumptions A1-A3 holds in the SG, the SPSA
algorithm is proved to converge in distribution to the Kuhn
Tucker (KT) pair of the original constrained MDP (Theorem
3 in [188]).
In [79], another distributed learning algorithm is constructed
based on the framework of LR−I learning in the team SGs.
A team SG can be considered as a variation of potential
games when all the players in a SG share the same pay-
off function (i.e., fully-cooperative SG). With the proposed
learning scheme, an LA is maintained for every state of the
underlying Markov chain by each player in the SG. At any
time instance, only one LA is activated by each player to learn
its optimal action probabilities in the corresponding state. The
introduction of LA reformulates the stochastic game between
the |N | players into a repeated game between the |N |×|S|
automata. Extending from the special case of team SGs, the
convergence condition of the LA-based learning scheme for
SGs is generalized by the following theorem:
Theorem 9 ([79]). For SG G= 〈N ,S,A, {ui},Pr(s′|s, a)〉,
assume that the multi-agent Markov chain corresponding to
each joint policy, π(s), is ergodic. If π∗(s) is a pure NE
policy in the view of |N | players in G, π∗(s) is also a pure
equilibrium for the reformulated game between the |N |×|S|
LA, and vice versa.
According to Theorems 4 and 9, whenever an NE point
in pure strategies exists in an SG (which is always the case
for team SGs), the LA-based learning algorithm proposed
in [79] is guaranteed to find the NE. However, it is worth
noting that only maintaining an independent, repeated-game-
based learning process (e.g., LA or SFP) for each state by the
players may not necessarily produce the NE strategies for a
general-case SG. Take the SFP learning scheme for example.
In a general-case SG, the action-dependent state transition
renders the Logit function in (31) no longer the solution to
the perturbed best response. As a result, a Lyapunov function
can not be found in the same way as for repeated games and
the convergence property of the corresponding best-response
dynamic in Robbins-Monro form is undermined. Therefore,
special structure is required for the SGs if the repeated-
game-based learning processes are to be adopted. In [191], a
sufficient condition is given for the adoption of the CODIPAS-
RL learning schemes (more specifically, LA and SFP-based
learning) in the general-case two-player nonzero-sum SGs:
C1) the state transitions are independent of the player actions.
It is easy to prove that given condition C1, by fixing the state
variable and solving for all the state-dependent NE with the
repeated game-based learning algorithms discussed in Section
V-A, we are able to obtain the state-independent NE of the
two-player nonzero-sum SGs. The conclusion can be further
extended to N -player games. When the state transitions are
also independent of the current state, each player only needs to
maintain a single learning process (see the examples in [191],
[192]). However, due to the constraint on the state transition
conditions, only a few applications of the SFP/GP/LA-based
algorithms for the SGs-based network control problems can
be found in the literature [192], [193].
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VI. CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES IN MODEL-FREE
LEARNING FOR COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
In this section, we expand our discussion to the challenges
and open issues that are yet to be addressed in the area of
learning for distributed control and/or wireless networking.
In Section VI-A, different aspects of the learning mechanism
goals are reviewed, and the potential conflict between these
aspects is discussed. In Section VI-B, we propose a problem
to cope with the outlier agents who do not (necessarily)
follow a given learning rule in a learner set. In Section VI-C,
the possibility of transferring experience from one learning
scenario/process to a difference learning scenario/process is
discussed. In Section VI-D, we discuss a problem on the coor-
dination among simultaneous learning modules over different
protocol layers for the same network entity.
A. The Goal of Learning: Self-Play, Stability and Optimality
Generally, the goal of a perfect self-organized learning
mechanism for multi-agent decision making processes is to
achieve self-play (autonomy), stability and optimality at the
same time. However, it has been well-recognized that for
multi-agent learning (more frequently in a stochastic scenario),
improving system performance typically incurs more signaling
and coordination, thus undermining the self-play structure.
Especially, when learning is implemented under the framework
of games, achieving any two goals of self-play, stability and
network optimality is usually at the cost of undermining the
third goal. In recent years, the relationship between the three
parties of the goals in multi-agent learning has been discussed
in many works, but mostly from a high-level theoretical
perspective [26], [172], [194].
In regard to the applications of learning in wireless net-
works, the situations that have been discovered to keep con-
sistence between a distributed solution and an optimal solution
are limited within a small scope. One important case of these
situations is the network control problems that is modeled
as a potential game [77]. For potential games, the following
properties [18] make it possible to achieve convergence to
the optimal operation point through adopting the learning
algorithms that we discussed in Section V-A:
• Every potential game has at least one pure strategy NE.
• Any global or local maxima of the potential function
defined in the game constitutes a pure strategy NE.
Based on the above properties, it is only necessary to prove
the uniqueness of the NE in a repeated game for learning
processes to achieve optimal operation point with sequential
best-response play [36] or no-regret learning. Apart from the
works discussed in Section V-A, the applications of distributed
learning in potential games in order to achieve global opti-
mization can usually be found in a set of congestion-game-
like problems such as [195], [196]. However, the potential
game requires that local users are able to (implicitly) perceive
the utilities of the entire network in order to establish the
correspondence between the local utility function and the
constructed potential function [77]. Since this requirement
is at the cost of trading off the conditions for self-play, it
significantly limits the applications for the potential-game-
based learning algorithms.
For other model-free distributed learning mechanisms in
a multi-device wireless network, how to coordinate the goal
of optimality and self-organization when adopting a learning
scheme generally remains an open question. As a result, most
current studies focus on ensuring convergence to the stable
operation point in self-play by allowing a limited level of
control signal exchange. Although there are a few already-
known conditions that ensure the convergence of a learning
algorithm, most of which are applicable to repeated games
(e.g., Theorem 2 and 3), for most current studies, whether
a stability condition can be found for a learning scheme
also remains an open issue. In the literature, the approaches
to find the convergence condition of the learning algorithms
generally fall into two major categories. For learning processes
that can be approximated with a linear system described
as a set of ODEs in continuous time, the typical way of
obtaining the convergence condition is to construct a Lyapunov
function for the ODE-based dynamic and then prove that the
strategy/utility updating mechanisms produce an asymptotic
pseudo-trajectory of the flow defined by the ODE through the
stochastic-approximation-based analysis (see the example in
[73], [152]). The analysis of learning using the ODE-based
approach can be found in [126], [142], [145], [159], [197].
For the situations which cannot be easily modeled as an linear,
ODE-based system, the contraction-map-based analysis (see
the example in [66]) can be considered as an alternative.
Usually, the contraction map is considered appropriate for the
analysis of SG-based learning when modeling the problem
is of high complexity [183], [184]. Table XII summarizes
convergence conditions for the multi-agent learning algorithms
discussed in Sections III-V.
In addition to the issues associated to finding the con-
vergence condition for a learning scheme, another concern
when applying model-free learning in wireless networks is the
convergence rate of learning algorithms. Although analytical
results for the convergence rate of learning algorithms are
highly desired, most of the existing studies are only able
to show empirical results for the learning convergence rate
through numerical simulations (see the examples in [88],
[183]). The reason for this is partly due to the asymptotic
convergence condition (if there is any), which requires for
most of existing learning algorithms that the states and actions
are visited infinitely to ensure the convergence. Given such a
limitation, one known approach to analyze the convergence
speed of a learning scheme is to view the learning process
itself as a discrete time Markov chain. In this approach, the
standard Markov chain analysis can be applied to obtain the
expected time (number of iterations) to learn before reaching
the chain’s absorbing state (e.g., the equilibrium point of
a repeated game). Such a technique can be found in the
recent studies [198], [199]. In [198], the Markov-chain-based
analysis is used to measure the lower bound of the iterations
needed for the Logit-function-based learning scheme to leave
a sub-optimal NE in a potential game for gateway selection
[198]. In [199], the same method is employed to track the
average iterations that a trial-and-error-based learning method
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TABLE XII
A SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL CONVERGENCE CONDITIONS FOR THE MAS-BASED LEARNING ALGORITHMS
Problem
Formulation
Category
Learning Scheme Convergence Condition Stable Operation
Point
Required Signaling
Loosely Coupled
MAS
Distributed (indepen-
dent) Q-learning
Generally not known Sub-optimal None
Repeated Games
Standard FP Not guaranteed except in (a) two-player
games and (b) multi-player game with com-
mon payoff [71]
ǫ-NE Exchange of local-
action information
Stochastic FP Not guaranteed except in (a) potential
games, (b) supermodular games (c) two-
player zero-sum games and (d) two-player
symmetric games [76]
ǫ-NE None
Gradient play Conditional convergence for strict NEs in
multi-player games [71]
NE Exchange of local-
action information
LR−I Conditional convergence for strict NEs in
multi-player games (see Theorem 4)
ǫ-NE None
No-external-regret
learning (Hedge)
Potential games NE None
No-internal-regret
learning
CE in multi-player games Non-social-optimal
CE [72]
None
Stochastic Games
Minimax Q-learning Not known NE Knowing the structure
of local payoff func-
tion
Nash Q-learning/R-
learning
Each matrix game has a unique NE [66],
[67]
NE Exchange of local ac-
tion/payoff information
Conjecture learning Conditional convergence Conjecture equilib-
rium
Knowing the reference
point
FP-based policy up-
dating
Generally not known NE Exchange of local-
action information
needs for reaching the NE of a joint channel-power selection
game for the first time. However, such an approach could be
computationally intractable when the system/learning scheme
is too complicated, and it is yet to be found applicable to the
more complex learning algorithms such as those in the SGs.
B. Heterogeneous Learning and Strategic Teaching in the
Context of Games
For the existing studies of strategy learning in wireless net-
works, one most important assumption is that each individual
agent abides by the same learning rule (or just uses variable
parameters for the same learning scheme). Only with such an
assumption, the convergence properties of the learning scheme
can be mathematically tracked. However, in many practical
scenarios, especially in the scenarios when malicious nodes
exist in the network, such an assumption may not be applicable
and the malicious nodes may intentionally deviate from the
given learning rule. One possible scenario of such a case can
be found in a selective-forwarding-based attack-defense game,
in which a sophisticated attacker with the ability of selectively
forwarding the received packets may wait and abide by the
normal packet forwarding rule until some critical packets are
sent to it before dropping. To the best of our knowledge,
currently there are few (if not any) works discussing this
situation.
To further demonstrate the situation in which a learner
may benefit by deviating from a common learning rule, we
introduce the concept of “strategic teaching”, which is first
discussed in the studies of economic games [200]. With
strategic teaching, it is assumed that the game is composed
of a number of adaptive players and sophisticated players.
An adaptive player learns its strategy following the learning
scheme that it is assigned to. By contrast, the sophisticated
players are able to adopt a non-myopically optimal strategy
and afford a certain short-term loss. Since the adaptive learners
will finally learn the best response to a pre-committed strategy
by the sophisticated player under the given learning scheme,
the sophisticated players will be able to induce the adaptive
players to expect some specific patterns of strategies from
them in the future [200]. Then, the sophisticated players
will be able to take advantage of the behavior patterns that
they “teach” the adaptive players. It has been found that a
sufficiently patient strategic teacher can achieve as much utility
as from first-play in a Stackelberg game14 [200]. Thus, the
sophisticated play may become a favorable way of strategy
adoption for a noncooperative or a malicious node in the
wireless network compared with the way of strictly following
the same learning rule.
In [200], a heuristic, model-free learning method known
as Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning (EWAL) [139]
is applied to a repeated trust game (i.e., lender-borrower
game) as the basis of both adaptive learning and sophisticated
learning. In that game, M borrowers try to borrow money
from each of a series of N lenders. A lender only makes
a one-time binary decision on either Loan or No Loan in a
single round out of a N -round game. A borrower makes a
series of N binary decisions on Repay or Default regarding
each lender that it borrows money from after observing the
lender’s decision. The sequences of the N -round stage-games
(also known as supergames) are repeated for many times
with a random order of lenders to make decisions with each
sequence. In one sequence, one borrower is picked as the
14About the difference of a Stackelberg equilibrium and an NE, the readers
are referred to [18] for more details.
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common borrower in the game. All the lenders and some of the
borrowers play as adaptive players and learn their strategies
with EWAL. The rest of borrowers are assumed to be dishonest
and adopt sophisticated play. It is assumed that the actions
and instantaneous payoffs of one player are observable by
the other players. For the adaptive players, EWAL uses the
Logit-function-based rule as in (42) for strategy updating.
Instead of directly using the instantaneous/accumulated payoff
as the argument of operator exp(·) in the Logit function,
EWAL introduces the concept of experience accumulation
through reinforcement and employs two new measurements
to build local experience: the observation-equivalents of the
past experience and the attraction to a specific strategy [139].
The former is similar to the action-frequency estimation in FP
and the latter is used as the argument of the Logit function.
In the game, the adaptive players apply EWAL twice to build
their attraction first within a lending-borrowing sequence (i.e.,
supergame) and then across the consequent sequences. For
the sophisticated borrowers, the learning process does not dif-
ferentiate between attraction building within a supergame and
across different supergames. A sophisticated borrower guesses
how the lender learns according to the attraction value of the
adaptive lender that it observes. Then, the policies of default
and repay are sought by incorporating estimated policies of the
lenders into the computation of its own sophisticated attraction
function (see Section 4.1 of [200] for the details). It has
been demonstrated in [200] that by adopting sophisticated play
with the attraction updating mechanism based on lender policy
estimation, the dishonest borrowers are able to outperform the
adaptive borrowers which follow the same EWAL learning rule
as the lenders. For simplicity, the mechanism of sophisticated
play can be interpreted as playing additional tricks to the
adaptive lenders by repaying frequently enough so if the
dishonest borrowers do default, it won’t lower the belief
probability of the lenders about the trustworthiness of these
borrowers below a critical level. Such an example provides an
important insight into the possible strength of sophisticated
play in repeated noncooperative games. However, few studies
discuss such an issue in the context of wireless networks.
Also, it is generally not clear how strategic teaching with
sophisticated play in other forms can be enforced or avoided
in the current framework of learning and in what ways it will
affect the equilibria that can be reached.
C. Experience Transferring between Heterogeneous Learners
As we note from Sections III-V, one of the significant
benefits of model-free learning is to allow the decision-making
entities to learn the strategies from scratch without the a-
priori knowledge of the wireless network. However, since
model-free learning is based on trial-and-error, when the
network environment has dramatically changed, the learners
generally need to start the same learning process from the
very beginning. One example of such scenarios can be found in
interference mitigation problem for cellular networks, in which
mobile stations may enter or leave the network frequently.
For most of the existing model-free learning algorithms, such
changes in the network topology mean the changes in the MDP
model of the network with new dimension of states/actions, if
MDP-based learning is adopted, or the transition from an old
network-control game to a new one since the set of players
is different, if game-based learning is adopted. As a result,
when it is required that the decision-making agents swiftly
switch from an old scenario to a new one, the existing learning
methods will face great challenges if they can only restart the
learning process in the new scenario.
In order to address such a challenge, a natural consideration
is to utilize the acquired experience of strategy taking which is
obtained from the old scenario. We note that such a process is
fundamentally different from the experience sharing process
discussed in Section IV-B, since for the experience-sharing
framework such as docitive networks, the parallel and homo-
geneous learning processes are assumed so the expert agent
is able to share its better experience of the same stochastic
process with the newcomers. In the scenarios of dramatical
environmental changes, the experience transferring paradigm,
Transfer Learning (TL) [138], is considered more appropriate
for the tasks of sharing experiences of strategy taking be-
tween heterogeneous learning processes. Compared with the
experience transferring between homogeneous learners, the
motivation of TL is to transfer knowledge (i.e., experience)
from the well-established learning processes (known as the
source tasks) to the newly established learning processes
(known as the target tasks) in a different situation. It is worth
noting that under the framework of MDP-based learning, TL
allows the difference in state spaces, state variables/transition,
reward functions and/or sets of actions [138].
TL has been considered difficult to implement for learning
in wireless networks. This is mainly due to the fact that
it is difficult to find a proper mapping (either in value-
function representation or directly in policy transferring [138])
to transfer between learning tasks with different action-state
representations. For the applications in wireless networks, one
example of policy-transferring TL can be found in [201]. In
[201], a highly dynamic opportunistic network which is based
on LTE-A is studied. The network topology is assumed to
change with time, and the eNodeBs (eNBs) are supposed to
be responsible for learning channel allocation under the condi-
tions of mutual interference among the user equipments. The
mechanism of policy transferring is adopted on the basis of
two model-free learning algorithms: the linear reinforcement
learning and the single-state Q-learning. The former employs
a simple, linear updating function for state-value updating,
while the latter applies Q-learning to update a state-less Q-
table. For TL, one shot of the changing network topology is
considered as a learning phase, then the objective of TL is
to apply the experience learned in previous phases (sources)
to the similar phases (targets) in the future. The eNBs which
attempt to assign channels to the user devices for interference
coordination work as the learning agents and obtain the
spectrum priority through sorting the Q-table obtained in the
current phase in a descent order. A policy function is designed
to transfer the Q-table learned in a previous phase to the
new phase through assigning weights to the source priority
table to the target priority table in the new phase. Such a
procedure of associating the channel priority in the target
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Fig. 18. Architecture of the policy-transfer mechanism in the LTE-A based
opportunistic network [201].
task with the channel priority in the source target can be
considered as initializing the learning process in the new
phase with the transferring knowledge from the old phase.
Thereby, the information from transfer learning and distributed
learning is combined through weighting the values of channel
priorities. The Q-table in the new phase is learned with the
given reinforcement learning methods. The policy transferring
process in [201] is demonstrated in Figure 18.
A different approach of applying TL to the wireless net-
working problems can be found in [202], where the authors
apply TL to a series of actor-critic learning processes to coor-
dinate BS switching/sleeping in a cellular network. In [202],
the possibility of improper guidelines provided by transferred
knowledge of the old task to the new task is considered. The
actor-critic learning scheme is performed by a BS-operation
controller, and is based on a multi-state MDP model for the
traffic load of the serving BSs. Compared with [201], the
difference of the TL mechanism in [202] lies in the way of
adopting the transferred policies. Instead of using the static
transferred knowledge for the initialization of the new learning
phase, the experience in the new learning phase is divided
into two sources: the “native policies” obtained through actor-
critic learning and the “exotic policies” obtained as transferred
policies from old tasks. The weight of the exotic policies
contributing to the overall strategy selection decreases as the
native learning process progresses. The learning-knowledge-
transferring process is demonstrated in Figure 19. It is math-
ematically proved that regardless of the initial value of the
overall policies and the transferred policies, the actor-critic-
learning-based algorithm is guaranteed to converge. Also,
numerical simulations show that TL does improve the learning
speed when compared with the reinforcement learning meth-
ods without TL.
In the literature, most of the applications of TL in wireless
networks are set in the scenarios which can be modeled as
MDP-based MAS. With all the existing effort for establishing
a general framework of applying TL to learning in wireless
networks, the following questions are to be answered:
1) Whether and how can TL be applied between related
games (e.g., symmetric games with the same structures of
payoffs and actions, but with different sets of players) for
accelerating the convergence speed to the equilibrium?
2) How can we measure the efficiency of knowledge trans-
ferring?
3) Apart from policy transferring and value-function trans-
ferring, can TL also be applied to heterogeneous learning
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Fig. 19. Architecture of the transfer-actor-critic algorithm [202].
processes using different learning schemes?
In the literature, few studies in wireless networks are found
discussing the aforementioned topics. However, discussions on
cross-game learning or cross-mechanism learning have already
begun in the area of economic games [203] and automatic
control [204]. Although the detailed discussion on these topics
is beyond the scope of this survey, it is believed that addressing
these issues will bring great improvement to the existing
learning mechanisms in the CRNs.
D. Coordination of Learning Modules: Integration vs. Decom-
position
In addition to the problems in heterogeneous learning
processes, handling experience sharing or transferring knowl-
edge among different network devices, the coordination of
simultaneously learning modules may still be a challenging
issue even within a single network device. As shown in our
previous discussion, learning processes targeting at various
functionalities (which may or may not involve the interactions
with other users) can happen in any layer of the protocol
stack (see Figures 7, 16 and 17 for example). Although
many existing works have succeeded in applying the learning-
based solution to their dedicated functionalities, a systematic
discussion on coordinating these learning processes for differ-
ent functionalities generally remain untouched in the current
research progress. In the seminal work [205], it is pointed out
that different functionalities across the protocol layers may
exhibit a range of conflicts and/or dependence when working
concurrently in the same network. Thereby, it becomes a
natural idea to consider the solutions to the learning module
coordination by first identifying the conflicts or dependence
in practical scenarios.
Based on the work in [205], [206], we consider the fol-
lowing major conflicts and/or dependence among different
network functionalities:
1) Logical dependence: this kind of dependence may arise
when there is a logical dependence between the objectives
of different network functions.
2) Parameter conflict/dependence: this kind of conflicts or
dependence is triggered either when different networking
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functions try to modify the same configuration parameters
or when the parameters of one function depends on some
other network parameters.
3) Measurement conflict: measurement conflicts exist if a
learning module depends on the state of the other learning
modules.
Logical dependence happens when different learning mod-
ules exhibit a hierarchical dependence on the output of each
other. In this sense, the relationship between different learning
modules in a CR device shares a lot of similarity with the rela-
tionship between the subtasks of a hierarchical reinforcement
learning mechanism [207], [208]. The major difference is that
in (MDP-based) hierarchical reinforcement learning, a single
learning process is decomposed into a number of subtasks
with their own sub-states, actions, transition functions and
rewards in a top-down manner with the help of recursive value
function decomposition15 [208]. Since hierarchical learning
requires to finish each child learning task before starting its
parent task, it extends the MDP-based system model into a
semi-MDP-based system model, in which the amount of time
for the transition from one action to the next is a random
variable due to the existence of the subtask sequences. By
adopting the general idea of hierarchical learning, learning
coordination with logical dependence can be considered as
a reverse process of hierarchical learning by integrating the
existing learning modules according to their dependence and
forming a macro learning task. Practically, such an operation
of module concatenation may be extended to the non-MDP-
based learning mechanisms. For example, in [180], [181] a
hybrid structure of both MDP-based Q-learning and repeated
game-based no-regret learning is formed to approximate the
equilibrium strategy of an SG. In those two cases, the expected
utility based on the learned equilibrium of the repeated game
can be considered as the instantaneous utility of the parent-
level Q-learning process. However, the major difficulty in
applying a hierarchical learning-based coordination mecha-
nism lies in the uncertainty of convergence, as we have
highlighted in V-B. Unlike the well-established examples of
hierarchical learning in the domain of robot control [207], For
the applications in CRNs there usually exists no terminal state
for a subtask to determine when to stop its execution. As a
result, when to start and terminate a task in the framework of
hierarchical learning are usually determined empirically, and
the convergence conditions of such a learning process still
remains an open issue.
Unlike logical dependence, parameter conflict/dependence
and measurement conflict are caused by the conflicts of the
actions and states in different learning modules, respectively.
For example, parameter conflict may happen between the inter-
cell interference control and the coverage/capacity optimiza-
tion modules of a cellular network. With respect to downlink
transmit power control, the interference control module may
want to decrease the transmit power in order to reduce the
inter-cell interference, while the coverage/capacity optimiza-
15A general principle for a hierarchical value function decomposition is that
the reward function of a parent task is the state-value function of the child
task [208].
tion modules may want to increase the transmit power to
improve the local link quality at the same time. For those
two kind of conflicts, one traditional solution is to build a
decision tree to activate different decision modules according
to the pre-determined conditions, which is also called trigger-
condition-action points [205]. However, the trigger-condition-
action based solution is a typical model-based method, and
thus cannot be directly incorporated into the coordination
process of learning modules.
Although no prototypical solution has been proposed to
resolve conflicts 2) and 3), it is still possible to address
these conflicts by imitating the existing model-based methods
when some certain property can be found in the learning
modules. Consider a general case where a number of learning
modules share a subset of network states, and try to learn the
strategy on the same action parameters to achieve different
goals. To resolve the conflicts, we can adopt the idea of
layering by decomposition in [16] to coordinate the learning
modules. One typical way of doing so is to pick the objective
of one network functionality as the major goal and treat
the goals of all the other functionalities as constraints. It is
worth noting that such an operation can be also considered
as a way of integration. However, the ultimate goal of it is
to create a structure of optimization which suits the further
operation of decomposing it into interrelated but layered
learning processes. A revisit to the work on layered Q-learning
for video compression [93] helps to exemplify such an idea
in details. In [93], a multimedia processing system considers
three different concurrent objective functions, which are the
video distortion at the codec level, the queueing delay for
video frame processing in the pre-encoding buffer, and the
energy cost in the OS/hardware layer. The distortion and
queueing delay can be treated as two objective functions in
the application layer of the system sharing the same system
state, while the configuration that defines the energy cost
(the operating frequency in this case) also determines the
distortion of the compressed video. In [93], minimizing the
queuing delay is considered as the main objective, and the rest
two objective functions are treated as constraints. Conflicts
between different functionalities can be easily found in this
case, since increasing the operating frequency will lead to a
better video quality but result in more energy consumption. By
creating such a constrained optimization problem, a layered
Q-learning mechanism is designed in a way that is similar to
the procedure of dual decomposition. As briefly discussed in
Section III, a two-layer learning framework is created in the
following way. In the application layer, the Q-learning module
receives the signaling from the OS/hardware layer about its
action (frequency selection) information, and learns the local
state value. In the OS/hardware layer, the local learning
process receives the estimated Q-value of the application layer
as part of its instantaneous utility, and then learns its own
state value. Unlike the hierarchical learning based integration
method, layered learning based on decomposition does not
require that one learning process to be finished first before
another learning process starts.
Like integration-based learning, the mathematical proof
of convergence for decomposition-based learning is still
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rarely discussed in the existing literature. In the mean-
while, although considered more autonomous than the
model-based coordination methods such as trigger-condition-
action, decomposition-based learning needs a pre-determined
constrained-optimization structure for layering of the learn-
ing processes. Such a requirement may limit the ability of
decomposition-based learning in quickly responding to the
requests of a certain network functionality that cannot be
reached in the given constrained-optimization structure. From
this point of view, finding a satisfying tradeoff between
different functionalities still remains an open question for
decomposition-based learning coordination.
VII. CONCLUSION
Owing to the distributive nature of cognitive wireless
networks, model-free learning is especially appropriate for
the wireless nodes to adaptively choose their transmission
strategies in a self-organized manner without much require-
ment for knowing the network conditions. In this paper, we
have provided a comprehensive survey on the applications of
the state-of-the-art learning mechanisms in a wide range of
scenarios of network modeling. With a broad-scope analysis
and comparisons of the literature, we have focused on learning
algorithms that can be categorized with a set of prototypical
schemes. Briefly, these prototypical schemes includes MDP-
based learning and experience sharing, conjecture-based learn-
ing, FP/GP-based learning, LA-based learning and no-regret
learning. We have classified the various scenarios for the
applications of learning into three major categories, namely,
the SAS-based network control, the loosely-coupled MAS-
based network control and the game-based network control.
We have mainly focused on the following characteristics of
the selected learning algorithms: (i) the ability of the learning
schemes to achieve optimality/equilibria without knowing an
a-priori model for the environment, (ii) the ability of the
learning schemes to achieve optimality/equilibria without ob-
taining the information that is not locally available and (iii) the
ability of the learning schemes to quickly adapt by exchanging
experience. In addition to detailed reviews of the existing
applications of learning in wireless networks, we have also
discussed a variety of open issues that need to be addressed in
future research. We hope this survey will serve as an important
guideline for future research directions to further understand
model-free learning mechanisms and expand their applications
in cognitive wireless networks.
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